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This thesis examines Wallace Stevens' poetic transvaluation of ritual. One of Stevens' 
primary concerns involves the creation of poetry that can serve as a valid substitute for 
orthodox religion. In the first chapter of this thesis I explore Stevens' ideas concerning 
religion and poetry through his letters, essays, and aphorisms. I also introduce two major 
studies of Stevens' poetic engagement with religion—one by Adalaide Morris and the 
other by David Jarraway—in an effort to outline major critical trends concerning the 
relationship between Stevens' poetry and religion. In the second chapter I introduce 
Jonathan Z. Smith's comprehensive theory of ritual, which guides the remainder of the 
study. I then suggest through historical analysis how the concept of ritual, as it came to 
be internalized through seventeenth-century Jesuit meditative practices, entered English 
religious poetry, and, through the development of the Romantic movement, exerted a 
strong influence on Stevens' meditative verse. In the third chapter, by providing full 
readings of two poems—"Metaphor as Degeneration" and "The Rock"—^I attempt to 
show how the concept of ritual can be used to understand and illimiinate Stevens' later 
poetry. And finally, as a means of concluding, I turn to "St. Armorer's Church from the 
Outside," a poem that reinforces the primary arguments of this thesis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In an effort to show deference to the poetry itself, I have chosen to introduce this 
study of Wallace Stevens by focusing attention upon two short poems written during the 
last five years of the poet's life. "The Planet on the Table" and "Final Soliloquy of the 
Interior Paramour" were composed in 1953 and 1950, respectively. Both are farewell 
poems, conceived after Stevens had become highly conscious of the fact that both his 
poetic career and his life were nearing their end; yet both poems also convey a strange 
feeling of anteriority in the particular way that they act as meta-poems, or poems about 
Stevens' own poetry, anticipating the sea of criticism that would soon follow. 
In "The Planet on the Table" (CP 532) Stevens muses retrospectively on his own 
poetic career. Harold Bloom has suggested that this poem's title is "perhaps referring to 
the manuscript that was to become The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens in 1954" 
{Poems 365). Bloom's suggestion must be phrased with uncertainty, but the poem's 
opening line leaves little doubt that this poem, like so many in Stevens' oeuvre, is 
intended to provide poetic commentary on the poet's own creations. Stevens begins the 
poem by referring to himself in the third person and naming himself after an exotic 
character—^two well-established conventions in his poetry—saying simply, "Ariel was 
glad he had written his poems." The poet's gladness arises from the fact that his poems 
preserve "a remembered time / Or something seen that he liked." The memories 
preserved in poems are countered in the second tercet by memories of nature itself, or 
"Other makings of the sun." These "makings" are the raw products of nature's fecundity, 
and they are different from Stevens' poems insofar as nature produces only "waste and 
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welter," a remembered ripeness that seems merely to have "writhed." The duality 
formulated in the first two tercets—^refined poetic creations versus raw natural 
creations—is brought together in the third, which begins, "His self and the sun were 
one." This marriage between self and sun is unusual insofar as it is stated 
straightforwardly, with a tone of unqualified confidence. The sun appears most 
fi"equently in Stevens' poems as an almost irreducible force with which the poet must 
struggle, for only a "recent imagining of reality" will allow his imagination to be united 
with the unimaginable energy of the sun. However, for readers familiar with the whole 
of Stevens' poetry, the imion of self and sun is not altogether surprising: Stevens 
repeatedly uses the sun as a symbol for nature's immense vitality, and the trope of the 
marriage sacrament appears throughout his poems to indicate moments when he is 
poetically capable of mating the creative power of his imagination with nature's writhing 
reality.^ 
Stevens expands on this idea in the next two lines, saying, "his poems, although 
makings of his self, / Were no less makings of the sun." These lines are significant 
because they demonstrate that at the end of Stevens' poetic career he had come to view 
Frank Dogget has provided the most thorough summary of Stevens' complex concept of "reality": 
''Reality, in Stevens' use of the word, may be the world supposed to be antecedent in itself or the world 
created in the specific occurrence of thought, including the thinker himself and his mind forming the 
thought. Often the term offers the assumption that if the self is the central point of a circle of infinite 
radius, then reality is the not-self, including all except the abstract subjective center. Sometimes reality is 
used in the context of the nominalist position—then the word denotes that which is actual and stands as a 
phenomenal identity, the existent as opposed to the merely fancied. Stevens usually means by reality an 
undetermined base on which a mind constructs its personal sense of the world. Occasionally he will use the 
word real as a term of approval, as a substitute for the word true, and, therefore, no more than an 
expression of confidence" (Cited in Bloom, Poems 307). Bloom simply says, "Emerson's nature is [...] 
Stevens' 'reality'" {Poems 310). For the purposes of this thesis, I will use the word "reality" to refer to the 
"xmdetermined base on which a mind constructs its personal sense of the world," a defmition that should be 
broad enough to include what Dogget terms the "not-self as well as "that which is actual and stands as a 
phenomenal identity." 
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the marriage between his imagination and reality as a poetic sacrament in which the two 
are joined though the one does not become the other. The significance of this idea 
becomes clearer when these lines are compared to earlier encoimters between the poet's 
imagination and nature's reality: in "Tea at the Palaz of Hoon," for example, Stevens 
says, "I was myself the compass of that sea: /1 was the world in which I walked, and 
what I saw / Or heard or felt came not but from myself (CP 65); and in "The Idea of 
Order at Key West," in reference to the girl who sings beside the sea, Stevens similarly 
says, "the sea, / Whatever self it had, became the self / That was her song, for she was the 
maker" (CP 129). This is Stevens at his least skeptical, expressing his own style of 
Nietzschean willflilness; but these moments of solipsistic exuberance become less 
frequent in his later poems, which are composed equally of self and sun, or imagination 
and reality. 
The fourth tercet opens with Stevens saying of his poems, "It was not important 
that they survive" (CP 532). What are we to make of this pronouncement, given that 
Stevens has already offered the preservation of memories as reason for gladness in his 
creative vocation? It is tempting to assign this seeming retraction to the example-bin of 
Stevens' frequent evasiveness, but such a reading fails to do justice to the remainder of 
the poem: 
What mattered was that they should bear 
Some lineament or character. 
Some affluence, if only half-perceived, 
In the poverty of their words. 
Of the planet of which they were part. 
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That Stevens' poems should "bear" something, in the transitive sense of the word, 
suggests a long list of possible meanings: to be equipped or fixmished with; to have as a 
feature or characteristic; to have as an identification; to call for as suitable or essential; to 
hold in the mind; to hold above, on top, or aloft; to support the weight of; to put up with 
especially without giving way; to move while holding up and supporting; to give birth to; 
to permit growth of; to produce as yield. I have intentionally placed these possible 
definitions in an order that suggests a kind of process: what matters in many of Stevens' 
most powerful poems is that they are equipped with an essential characteristic which, 
when held aloft in the mind, allows for a sense of movement—even xmder tremendous 
strain—that leads to some kind of rebirth, or some kind of life-enhancing vitality. This 
statement serves as a place to begin, and I have deliberately used wide-ranging terms. 
My intention in this paper is to illxmiinate and clarify how Stevens' poems come to enact 
the aforementioned process, and what is created as a result. 
In the final tercet of "The Planet on the Table," Stevens desires that his poems 
will bear "Some affluence." This affluence is not specifically described; rather, it is 
broadly figured as "Some lineament or character" that may be only "half-perceived, / In 
the poverty" of his poems' "words." Broadly speaking, lineament means distinctive 
features or characteristics; but lineament also connotes the process of delineation. 
Stevens fi-equently uses "poverty" to indicate our need for fresh imaginings of reality; 
words become impoverished by habitual associations, so that affluence is attained only 
when words are placed within the delineated space of the poem, where they are stripped 
of their associative dross and freshly conceived by the imagination. The poem finally 
appears to suggest that what matters to Stevens at the end of his life is not that his poems 
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merely "survive" as objets d'art, but that they actively delineate a poetic space in which 
our experience of the planet's writhing reality transcends an empirical experience of 
"waste and welter" by attaining the sanction of revitalized meaning. 
The "affluence" that is attained within the space of the poem is rooted neither 
solely in Ariel nor solely in nature, but also in the ordered linguistic space of "words" 
that is produced by the marriage of that duality. Stevens puns on the word "character," 
the meaning of which includes the alphabet that forms the words of his poems, his 
distinct style of writing, and the character of Ariel, or the spirit of the poet lingering in 
the poems. The personal "remembered time" or the subjective "something that he liked" 
may expire with the poet who cannot hope to survive much longer, but Stevens hopes that 
"some lineament" of "affluence" and some sense of his distinct poetic spirit will continue 
to haunt his poetry. This spirit appears in "A Postcard from the Volcano," a much earlier 
poem, as "A spirit storming in blank walls" (CP 159), a pun in which Stevens' blank 
verse is figured as walls that delineate the space of the poem. "The Planet on the Table" 
is written in iambic tetrameter, which, like blank verse, is one of Stevens' favored forms; 
but whether Stevens was writing in pentameter or tetrameter, he believed that poems are 
necessary because they structure the space in which they are contained, and therefore 
imbue whatever is brought into that space with order and meaning. As early as 1918, in 
an unpublished poem titled "Architecture," Stevens asks "What maimer of building shall 
we build?" and proceeds to describe in architectural terms a poetic space in which "the 
lusty and the plenteous / Shall walk" (OP 39). In The Dome and the Rock, James Baird 
has commented extensively on the importance of delineated space in Stevens' poetry, 
going so far as to claim that "for Stevens the dynamics of architecture were commanding 
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[...]. The power of the concept was obsessive. Almost hterally, his first and last choices 
as a craftsman were posited upon architecture" (3). And B.J. Legget has argued that 
Stevens' philosophical stance shifted significantly after "Notes Toward a Supreme 
Fiction," largely as a result of his discovery of Henri Focillon's The Life of Forms in Art, 
a book that derives aesthetic theories from the study of architecture. 
The theme of delineated poetic space is taken up explicitly in "Final Soliloquy of 
the Interior Paramour" (CP 524), but with a shift in emphasis from the space of the poem 
to the space of the mind that creates the poem. As Stevens' muse, the paramour instructs 
the poet to "Light the first light of evening, as in a room / In which we rest and, for small 
reason, think / The world imagined is the ultimate good." Stevens frequently employs 
man-made light as a symbol for the ordering capacity of the imagination. In "The Idea of 
Order at Key West," for example, "the glassy lights" of the harbor "Mastered the night 
and portioned out the sea," serving as a metaphor for the "maker's rage to order words" 
(CP 130). In "The Auroras of Autumn," the poet is figured as the "scholar of one 
candle"—another of Stevens' symbols for the ordering light of artifice—^who "feels 
afraid" as he attempts to imaginatively master the immense, fluctuating, natural beauty of 
the northern lights (CP 417). In "Final Soliloquy," within the room's ordering light, the 
poet and the interior paramour come together in "the intensest rendezvous," a meeting 
that takes place within the "vital boundary" of "the mind" and results in the creation of 
the poem (CP 524). 
Within this space—delineated by the poet's mind at the time of creation and the 
poem itself afterwards—"we collect ourselves," 
Out of all the indifferences, into one thing: 
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Within a single thing, a single shawl 
Wrapped tightly round us, since we are poor, a warmth, 
A light, a power, the miraculous influence. 
The poverty of words in "The Planet on the Table" has been replaced in this poem by our 
own poverty of indifference. The problem posed by indifference is not simply a matter of 
feeling generally indifferent or apathetic; here the word also suggests its archaic meaning, 
signifying a lack of difference or distinction between two or more things, which in turn 
creates an absence of compulsion toward one thing or another. We are impoverished 
because we need to be compelled by the vitality of fi^esh seeing or new knowledge, and 
because evening's failing light threatens to drown all meaning in an indistinct sea of 
darkness. This threat to the poet's humanity is countered by the illxmiinating and 
ordering influences of the candle-light, a metaphor for the generative mind of the poet. 
The ordering influence of the poet's mind and its propensity to focus attention create the 
comfort of "a warmth," which protects like a "shawl" against the coldness of 
undifferentiated darkness. Within the warmth of meaning generated by the imagination, 
we experience "the miraculous influence," whereby we gain full participation in the order 
of the poem—"we forget each other and ourselves"—and "We say God and the 
imagination are one... Stevens indicates in a letter to Joseph Bennet that he "originally 
intended to write a long poem on the subject [...] but got no further than the statement 
that God and the imagination are one. The implications of this statement were to follow" 
(L 701). 
Most critics have focused their attention on this identification between God and 
the imagination, finding in it a direct, late example of Stevens' longstanding tendency to 
7 
embrace hiunanistic substitution, whereby the generative imagination of the poet replaces 
the generative power of a deceased God. Although Stevens did employ this type of 
apotheosis in some of his well-known poems from the 1930's, such readings of "Final 
Soliloquy" are reductive. Stevens changed the poem twice after initially sending it to 
Bennet, who had solicited poems from Stevens for the Hudson Review. Here the three 
versions are listed chronologically: 
We say God and the imagination are one... 
How high that highest candle lights the world! 
We say God and the imagination are one. 
How high that highest candle lights the world... 
We say God and the imagination are one... 
How high that highest candle lights the dark. (L 701) 
In a letter that accompanied the first revision, Stevens indicates that his change is 
intended to eliminate the exclamation point. The exclamation point forces too much 
optimistic closure on the outcome of the identification between God and the imagination. 
The first version, had it remained definitive, comes dangerously close to engendering a 
new indifference. If the individual imagination is merely deified, and the light of the 
individual imagination is made omnipresent, then the movement of meaning becomes 
static, and undifferentiated darkness is replaced by undifferentiated light. The first 
revision eliminates the exclamation point, but the shifted placement of the ellipsis 
changes the reference of the void it represents. The statement that God and the 
imagination are one ends with much more closure than the ellipsis had allowed, while the 
elliptical void opens behind the relationship of candle and world. The final version, 
which appears in the Collected Poems, returns the ellipsis to its original position, and the 
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void opens once again behind the identity of God and the imagination. However, the 
"highest candle" now lights "the dark" rather than "the world" (L 701). "The world" has 
already appeared in the poem as "the world imagined," and if the "highest candle" of the 
imagination lights that world, then it lights only itself (CP 524). These revisions are 
important because they reveal an abiding concern in Stevens' later work: humanistic 
substitution, or the deification of the subjective imagination, cannot occupy a self-
contained, self-generating space without acknowledging the void that inevitably 
surrounds that space, or the poet's creative capacity collapses into solipsism. 
Stevens implicitly acknowledges this concern when he suggests it is for "small 
reason" that we "think / The world imagined is the ultimate good," a point often 
overlooked by critics (CP 524, emphasis mine). Stevens seems to suggest that if the 
imagined world is to be regarded as the ultimate good, it must not be conceived by 
isolated reason writ large, or by rationality's self-generating light. Ultimately, the 
imagined world is "good" only when it acknowledges nature's "nothing that is" (CP 10), 
which in this poem appears as evening's darkness. Additionally, the "highest candle" of 
imaginative power only reaches its height with the establishment of a "vital boundary" 
that allows the "rendezvous" of imagination and reality to be recognized and claimed 
within the mind (CP 524). This boundary is vital because meaning does not emerge 
within the hermetically sealed imagination, but in the ellipsis, or void, that opens beyond 
the generative imagination, or in the incongruency between the light of the imagination 
and the darkness that surrounds it. Stevens carmot ''say God and the imagination are 
one," until he "feeds'] the obscurity of an order, a whole, / A knowledge, that which 
arranged the rendezvous" (CP 524 emphasis mine). The poem enacts this feeling of an 
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obscure order through an incongruency of location. The "here" of the "room," the 
"rendezvous," and the "mind" becomes "there" at the end of the poem: "Out of this same 
light, out of the central mind, / We make a dwelling in the evening air, / In which being 
there together is enough." It is also important to notice the ambiguity of the word "out" 
in the preceding lines. To make a dwelling out of the light, or a poem out of the central 
mind, could mean that the poem is produced by the mind's generative light, or it could 
mean that the poem is made outside the light, at the vital point of obscurity where light 
fails into darkness. The ambiguity is ultimately unresolved. In "The Irrational Element 
in Poetry," Stevens contends that "men in general do not create in light and warmth 
alone. They create in darkness and coldness" (OP 262). 
The "order" in "Final Soliloquy" is "whole" insofar as it arranges our knowledge 
of the relationship between "here" and "there," between "in" and "out," between "light" 
and "dark" (CP 524). In much the same way, "The Planet on the Table" suggests that the 
poem's "affluence" can only be achieved through the "poverty" of the words that 
comprise the poem, or that a certain arrangement of normally impoverished words bears 
the mark of enrichment when encountered within the delineated space of the poem. This 
is not, however, to suggest that the poems achieve final closure. Just as "affluence" is 
never explicitly articulated in "The Planet on the Table," but is held in unresolved tension 
with "the poverty of words" (CP 532), so too, in "Final Soliloquy," the feeling of 
obscurity never gives way to a complete or final clarity, and the elliptical void that opens 
behind the unity of God and the imagination is never completely filled. In the final line 
of "Final Soliloquy," the feeling of "being there together" is "enough"—^but, one might 
add, it is enough only in this fleeting moment (CP 524). As soon as "here" is established, 
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it has already become "there." The feeling generated by this shift in perspective is one of 
dislocation, as if the terms of the poem's dichotomous arrangements are not fixed in time, 
but are brought together and momentarily suspended in precise but fluid opposition. 
As such an analysis makes clear, Stevens did not restrict himself to the statement 
that "God and the imagination are one" (L 701). While "Final Soliloquy" may not have 
achieved the length Stevens first envisioned, he manages with a great deal of subtlety to 
communicate some of the primary implications of this statement. "Final Soliloquy" 
generates an abiding sense of incongruency by drawing a "vital boundary" between the 
room and the evening's darkness, and by acknowledging the void that always exists 
beyond the imagination. In this way, the poem subtly takes the shape of colloquy, as if to 
suggest that an obscure dialogue stands behind or beyond the internal monologue. The 
case for such a reading is reinforced in "The Irrational Element in Poetry," where Stevens 
contends that "The rational mind, dealing with the known, expects to find it glistening in 
a familiar ether. What it really finds is the unknown always behind and beyond the 
known, giving the appearance, at best, of a chiaroscuro" (OP 232). Etymologically, 
chiaroscuro combines clarity and obscurity without becoming nonsensical, suggesting 
heightened contrast and interdependence rather than mere contradiction. In "Final 
Soliloquy," the sanctioning of the imagination's generative power does not rely solely on 
the imagination's soliloquy, or its propensity to contradict silent and imdifFerentiated 
darkness, but on the "whole" of interplay and contrast that emerges between the soliloquy 
and the elliptical void that stands beyond it. 
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Stevens desired to create poetry that could serve as a tenable substitute for 
traditional religion. The poetic space delineated by the "vital boundary" of "Final 
Soliloquy" can be understood as a secular space intended to fulfill a traditionally 
religious fiinction. Stevens' declaration that God and the imagination are one does not 
mean that the individual subject is simply deified; rather, the declaration suggests that 
poetic imagination, by marrying itself to the darkness of the imknown, is capable of 
producing transcendent moments, or "that which gives us a momentary existence on an 
exquisite plane" (OP 228). Stevens fi-equently portrays such moments using the trope of 
marriage, so that a poetic transvaluation of the marriage sacrament reveals the secular 
relationship between imagination and reality's otherness. Religious sacraments 
traditionally take place within a ritual environment; when these sacraments are 
transvalued by Stevens, they provide visionary moments, or what he generally defines as 
poetic sanctions that lead to nobility. Thus many of Stevens' poems, and particularly his 
later poems, can be interpreted as abstracted and secularized ritual spaces. When the 
concept of ritual is employed by Stevens' critics, it is invariably used in a pejorative 
sense to indicate the thoughtless habits encouraged by orthodox religious faith. Stevens 
explicitly attempts to overcome such habits; but this pejorative understanding of ritual 
reveals an unnecessary Protestant bias that has persisted since the Reformation. When 
ritual is broadly understood as a process that structures and organizes experience, 
providing moments of transcendence and sanctions for human life, then the general 
concept of ritual reveals how certain of Stevens' poems might, in fact, fiilfill his desire to 
provide a valid substitute for religion. 
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1. 
"IT IS NOT POSSIBLE MERELY TO DISBELIEVE' 
The "lineament" of "The Planet on the Table," like the "vital boundary" of "Final 
Soliloquy," foregrounds the importance of delineated poetic space in Stevens' poetic 
project (CP 532, 524). Within the delineated space of the poem, the "affluence" of "the 
planet," like the generative power of the imagination, is sanctioned (CP 532). In "Final 
Soliloquy," it is "the miraculous influence" of delineated poetic space that provides the 
grounds on which Stevens can "say God and the imagination are one" (CP 524). The 
explicitly religious character of the terminology in these lines is unmistakable, but it 
raises an important question. Stevens is often cited, alongside William Carlos Williams, 
as one of America's first genuinely atheistic poets. "Sunday Morning," a frequently 
anthologized early poem, appears to make a clear case for atheism, as do other early 
poems that polemically argue against Christianity, such as "Of Heaven Considered as a 
Tomb" and "A High-Toned Old Christian Woman." In addition to these explicit 
examples, many of Stevens' poems undeniably engender a Nietzschean transvaluation of 
values, or extol new naturalistic ideas of divinity to replace old orthodox ideas of 
divinity, or posit the virtue of unending earthly flux over the vice of changeless paradisial 
eternity. A close reading of Stevens' letters and prose, however, indicates that the 
rejection of Christianity and its particular metaphysical supports cannot be so easily 
extrapolated into certain, absolute atheism. In a letter written as late as 1951, he says 
clearly, "I am not an atheist although I do not believe to-day in the same God in whom I 
believed when I was a boy" (L 735); in another letter, written to Hi Simons in 1940, 
Stevens says, "If one no longer believes in God (as truth), it is not possible merely to 
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disbelieve" (L 370); and in Wallace Stevens: Art of Uncertainty, one of the first book-
length studies of Stevens' poetry to emerge after his death, Herbert J. Stem rightly 
contends that "for Stevens, no less than for Matthew Amold, the salient fiinction of art 
was one we may legitimately call a religious function" (89). While Stevens undoubtedly 
rejected, at a relatively young age, the ontological foundationalism and worn-out 
attributes of a Christian God, he continued throughout his life to try to write poems that 
could provide what religion had once provided for humanity. 
Stevens was raised in a religious household in Reading, Pennsylvania, as a journal 
entry from 1912 makes clear: "I remember how [my mother] always read a chapter from 
the Bible every night to all of us when we were ready for bed. [...] She always 
maintained an active interest in the Bible, and found there the solace she desired—She 
was, of course, disappointed, as we all are" (L 173). Stevens' ambivalence toward 
religion, hinted at in this disappointment, is captured in a journal entry from August of 
1902, when the poet was twenty-two. The entry describes "a handsome day" on which 
Stevens took one of his oft-described walks that left him "contented again": 
Last night I spent an hour in the dark transept of St. Patrick's Cathedral 
where I go now and then in my more lonely moods. An old argument with 
me is that the true religious force in the world is not the church but the 
world itself: the mysterious callings of Nature and our responses. What 
incessant murmurs fill that ever-laboring, tireless church! But today in my 
walk I thought that after all there is no conflict of forces but rather a 
contrast. [...] The priest in me worshipped one God at one shrine; the poet 
another God at another shrine. [...] As I sat dreaming with the 
congregation I felt how the glittering altar worked on my senses 
stimulating and consoling them; and as I went tramping through the fields 
and woods I beheld every leaf and blade of grass revealing or rather 
betokening the Invisible. (L 59) 
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For readers who are familiar only with the most common characterizations of Stevens as 
staunch atheist, it may come as a surprise to learn that he sometimes visited a cathedral to 
find solace. Clearly, however, when Stevens contemplates the difference between the 
natural, murmuring realm of nature and the orthodox realm of the cathedral, he finds a 
stimulating contrast rather than a pure contradiction. While such a firmly relativistic 
stance disallows Christianity's claim to absolute truth, it is not wholly antagonistic 
toward the environment provided by the church. In fact, by the 1930's Stevens had 
managed to synthesize some of the contrasts noted in this letter, arguing in the "Adagia" 
that "The poet is the priest of the invisible" (OP 195). 
As early as 1909 Stevens was begirming to refine his view of religion. In a letter 
to Elsie Moll, who was soon to become his wife, Stevens records his thoughts after 
having "dropped into St John's chapel an hour before the service and sat in the last pew 
and looked aroimd" (L 140). Stevens says that the mystification and entrancement of the 
spirit provided by "the space, the gloom, [and] the quiet" of this particular chapel "is not 
enough," because the Christian church's "vitality depended on its association with 
Palestine," or on its location within a particular time and place that had become so distant 
from Stevens' own time and place as to render it powerless (L 140). Stevens does not 
feel "the wonder of the life and death of Jesus" when he looks upon the church's "gold 
cross on the altar," so he turns his thoughts "fi-om this chapel to those built by men who 
felt the wonder of the life and death of Jesus—temples full of sacred images, full of the 
air of love and holiness—tabernacles hallowed by worship that sprang fi-om the depths of 
men familiar with Gethsemane, familiar with Jerusalem" (L 140). For Stevens, a lack of 
emotional reverberation always indicates a loss of the human capacity to make sensory 
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perceptions transcend the empirical process from which they arise. In this letter, Stevens 
acknowledges that the capacity for transcendence has been linked historically to the 
sacredness encountered in temples. Though such encounters are no longer possible in the 
orthodox setting of the church, Stevens' attitude toward the concept of sacredness is far 
from inimical. 
The cross on the altar of St. John's chapel does not convey a sense of the sacred to 
Stevens because the cross's sacredness depends on an untenable, ontological belief in the 
historical life of Jesus. In the same letter Stevens goes on to say, 
Reading the life of Jesus [...] makes one distinguish the separate idea of 
God. Before today I do not think I have ever realized that God was 
distinct from Jesus. It enlarges the matter almost beyond comprehension. 
People doubt the existence of Jesus—at least, they doubt incidents of his 
life, such as, say, the Ascension into Heaven after his death. But I do not 
understand that they deny God. I think everyone admits that in some form 
or another. (L 140) 
Having accumulated nearly two thousand years of orthodox associations, the cross no 
longer produces a fresh sense of the invisible power it once conveyed to Christian 
believers. For Stevens, specific orthodox figurations of God must be separated from the 
more general idea of God, which is a human construct and thus remains important not in 
an ontological sense, but rather as an imaginative idea. This idea is essential for two 
reasons: the irreducible otherness of God provides a potency against which habitual 
perceptions and entrenched solipsism can be broken, and the unifying transcendence of 
God provides the possibility that the abyss separating self and world can, during certain 
moments, temporarily be overcome. As Stem has aptly suggested. 
It was Stevens' conviction that although we can, if only because we must, 
learn to Uve without God, we cannot, if we are to remain human, live 
without the satisfactions that belief in God could formerly provide. 
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Whatever else religion of more devout ages than our own may have done, 
it did at least supply substance for visions grander than the empiricism of 
the present age has been able to achieve. (89) 
For these reasons, Stevens contends that "it is not possible merely to disbelieve" in the 
idea of God, but that "it becomes necessary to believe in something else," or in another 
"thing created by the imagination" (L 370). 
If any of these new things created by the imagination are truly to engender belief, 
they will necessarily be rooted in the time and place in which they are created. For 
Stevens, imaginative creations such as specific gods or particular figurations of God 
always arise from local soil and local needs. This notion appears explicitly in "Two or 
Three Ideas," an essay v^ritten nearly a half-century after the journal entry of 1902. 
Describing the significance of "the gods of classical mythology," Stevens contends that 
in the blue air of the Mediterranean these white and a little colossal figures 
had a special propriety, a special felicity. Could they have been created 
for that propriety, that felicity? Notwithstanding their divinity, they were 
close to the people among whom they moved. Is it one of the normal 
activities of humanity, in the solitude of reality and in the unworthy 
treatment of solitude, to create companions, a little colossal as I have said, 
who [...] are, at least, assumed to be full of the secret of things and who in 
any event bear in themselves, even if they do not always wear it, the 
peculiar majesty of mankind's sense of worth, neither too much nor too 
little? [...] The celestial atmosphere of these deities, their ultimate remote 
celestial residences are not matters of chance. Their fijndamental glory is 
the fundamental glory of men and women, who being in need of it create 
it. (OP 260-61) 
As a young man who was still twenty-one years from publishing his first book of poems, 
Stevens sometimes turned to a cathedral—a space associated with one particular 
figuration of God—^to cure himself of loneliness; as a mature poet who had published five 
volumes of poetry, Stevens views the very creation of gods as an "unworthy treatment of 
solitude" (OP 261). Despite this shift, Stevens acknowledges an over-arching himian 
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need to create something "full of the secret of things," something that bears "the peculiar 
majesty of mankind's sense of worth" (OP 261). For Stevens, who grew up in 
Pennsylvania, moved to New York, and settled in Connecticut, the problem is that "In the 
North and East the church is more or less moribimd" (L 237). In other words, Stevens 
sees himself living in a time and place in which a firm belief in "the gods, both ancient 
and modem, both foreign and domestic," is no longer possible (OP 259). The unhappy 
result of this impossibility is summarized in the same essay, where Stevens says. 
To see the gods dispelled in mid-air and dissolve like clouds is one of the 
great human experiences. It is not as if they had gone over the horizon to 
disappear for a time; nor as if they had been overcome by other gods of 
greater power and profounder knowledge. It is simply that they came to 
nothing. Since we have always shared all things with them and have 
always had a part of their strength and, certainly, all of their knowledge, 
we shared likewise this experience of annihilation. It was their 
annihilation, not oxirs, and yet it left us feeling dispossessed and alone in a 
solitude, like children without parents, in a home that seemed deserted, in 
which the amicable rooms and halls had taken on a look of hardness and 
emptiness. (OP 260) 
Although the gods have come "to nothing," Stevens cannot adopt the purely atheistic 
stance of mere disbelief, because such a stance leads to feelings of annihilation, 
dispossession, isolation, desertion, hardness, and emptiness (OP 260). 
Religion has traditionally provided the foundational framework through which the 
idea of God has been understood and articulated; it follows, then, that if the idea of God 
is to be maintained in an age when orthodox religious belief is no longer tenable, religion 
must be replaced by something else that is capable of engendering belief In a letter to Hi 
Simons written in 1940, Stevens emphasizes the need for a "substitute" that can take the 
place of religion: 
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[T]he strength of the church grows less and less until the church stands for 
little more than propriety [...]. I ought to say that it is a habit of mind with 
me to be thinking of some substitute for religion. [...] My trouble, and the 
trouble of a great many people, is the loss of belief in the sort of God in 
Whom we were all brought up to believe. (L 348) 
To create a substitute that could compensate for the loss of belief in God, Stevens turned 
his attention toward the creation of poetry that would be rooted firmly in his own time 
and place and conditioned by the needs he encountered there. As Adalaide Morris has 
suggested, "what Stevens confesses as a habit of mind, his poetry and prose reveal to be a 
near obsession. His search for a substitute for religion occupied his poetic energy from 
the early poetry to the late" (9). 
Such a claim is bom out not only in Stevens' poetry, but also in his prose. As this 
study unfolds, I will return to many of these passages and the issues they address; here, 
however, I have chosen to present them without a great deal of commentary in order to 
demonstrate the extent to which Stevens' poetic vocation was, according to his own 
letters, essays, and aphorisms, inextricably linked to religious issues such as the idea of 
God, the efficacy of the church, and the question of belief After Stevens suggests to Hi 
Simons that disbelief in God makes it "necessary to believe in something else," he says. 
Logically, I ought to believe in essential imagination, but that has its 
difficulties. It is easier to believe in a thing created by the imagination. A 
good deal of my poetry recently has concerned the identity of that thing. 
[...] In one of the short poems that I have just sent to the Harvard 
Advocate, I say that one's final belief must be in a fiction. I think that the 
history of belief will show that it has always been a fiction. (L 370) 
In another letter to Simons in which Stevens answers questions about certain difficulties 
in his poems, he once again aligns God and fiction, saying, "the fictive abstract is as 
immanent in the mind of the poet, as the idea of God is immanent in the mind of the 
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theologian" (L 434). In the same letter, Stevens describes his purpose in writing "Notes 
Toward a Supreme Fiction" as "trying to create something as valid as the idea of God has 
been" (L 435). In 1940, Henry Church wrote to Stevens for advice; a man of some 
wealth. Church was in the process of drafting a legal will, and he desired that money 
from his estate be used to establish a Chair of Poetry at an American university. In his 
response, Stevens explains his own opinion concerning the study of poetry: 
What is intended is to study the theory of poetry in relation to what poetry 
has been and in relation to what it ought to be. [...] While aesthetic ideas 
are commonplace in this field, its import is not the import of the 
superficial. The major poetic idea in the world is and always has been the 
idea of God. One of the visible movements of the modem imagination is 
the movement away from the idea of God. The poetry that created the 
idea of God will either adapt it to our different intelligence, or create a 
substitute for it, or make it unnecessary. These alternatives probably mean 
the same thing. (L 377-78) 
In the "Adagia," a collection of aphorisms believed to have been written at various times 
from the early 1930's to the mid 1940's, Stevens contends that "After one has abandoned 
a belief in god, poetry is that essence which takes its place as life's redemption" (OP 
185). Later in the same collection, he says, "The relation of art to life is of the first 
importance especially in a skeptical age since, in the absence of a belief in God, the mind 
turns to its own creations and examines them, not alone from the aesthetic point of view, 
but for what they reveal, for what they validate and invalidate, for the support that they 
give" (OP 186). In addition to validation and support, Stevens reiterates several lines 
later that "Poetry is a means of redemption" (OP 186). Of the poet, Stevens says, "It is 
he that invented the Gods. It is he that put in their mouths the only words they have ever 
spoken" (OP 193). He goes on to say that "God is a symbol for something that can as 
well take other forms, as, for example, the form of high poetry" (OP 193). Near the end 
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of the "Adagia," Stevens says, "God is in me or else is not at all (does not exist)" (OP 
198). And finally, in "Two or Three Ideas," Stevens argues that "In an age of disbelief, 
or, what is the same thing, in a time that is largely humanistic, in one sense or another, it 
is for the poet to supply the satisfaction of belief, in his measure and in his style" (OP 
259). As these examples clearly indicate, Stevens' abiding concern with religion guided 
him as a poet, deeply affecting his reason for writing as well as his conception of what 
poetry could accomplish. A full understanding of Stevens' poems demands a critical 
approach that accounts for the post-Christian religious content they contain. 
Most of Stevens' critics tend to adopt one of two general views concerning the 
issue of religion in his poetry. One the one hand, many critics are quick to call attention 
to Stevens' atheism, finding support for this approach in his overt rejection of 
Christianity as well as all other traditional religions and their orthodoxies. These critic 
tend in one way or another to read Stevens as a poet of "reality." By discounting 
religious considerations outright, critics writing in this vein are free to view Stevens as 
the great poet of the mind adhering to some variety of Freudian empiricism, or as the 
astute philosopher-poet bent on discovering his own naturalistic epistemology. While 
these approaches should be available to the reader who desires a full understanding of 
Stevens' poetry, they both fail to account for Stevens' explicit intention to write poetry 
that could serve as an adequate substitute for religion, an intention that the previous 
excerpts from his prose make abundantly clear. Images and ideas involving the 
miraculous, the revelatory, and the sacramental appear again and again in Stevens' 
poems. According to Thomas Walsh's Concordance to the Poetry of Wallace Stevens, 
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explicit allusions to divinity or the divine appear no less than twenty-five times in his 
Collected Poems, along with twenty-four references to churches or cathedrals, and at 
least fifty references to God or the gods. 
On the other hand, many critics view Stevens as a modem humanist heir to the 
romantic tradition and focus on his valorization of the creative power of the imagination, 
which they take to be a substitute in Stevens' poetry for traditional, orthodox theism. At 
its most reductive, this second view accuses Stevens of simply deifying subjective 
creativity, and these critics consequently tend to read Stevens as a poet of the 
"imagination," frequently viewing him as the modem artist-hero exercising his 
Nietzschean will-to-power. This stance, while certainly tenable and oftentimes 
illuminating—^particularly when applied to Stevens' least skeptical moments of solipsistic 
exuberance—frequently fails to capture the complexity of Stevens' stmggle to overcome 
the "trouble" caused by "the loss of belief in the sort of God in Whom [he was] brought 
up to believe" (L 348). In short, these critics tend to ignore the implications of Stevens' 
insistence that an "essential imagination [...] has its difficulties" (L 370). 
Recent critics, attempting to acknowledge the difficulties posed by essential 
imagination without reading Stevens as a poet of "reality," tend to view him as an early 
postmodern poet demonstrating through rhetoricity the problematic nature of linguistic 
referentiality. The problem with these theories, which will be discussed in more depth as 
I consider one postmodem critic's approach to Stevens, is that they unjustly mle out the 
possibility that poetry can provide any affirmations whatsoever, or "that which gives us a 
momentary existence on an exquisite plane" (OP 228). Stevens believed that "the 
unknown" will always be found "behind and beyond the known, giving it the appearance, 
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at best, of a chiaroscuro" (OP 232); but such a belief does not imply that his poetry is best 
understood in terms of the negations associated with the abyss of language. 
Adalaide Morris and David Jarraway have both written extensive book-length 
studies of Stevens' poetry that focus on his engagement with religious concerns. Of the 
two, Morris remains closer to the spirit of Stevens' poetry, acknowledging both his 
attempt to create imaginative poetic fictions that could serve as secularized temples and 
his continual use of sacramental tropes. Jarraway's study is insightful insofar as his 
mastery of postmodern theory allows him to bring a wide range of the twentieth century's 
most important philosophical ideas to bear on Stevens' poetry, a critical endeavor that 
results in fresh readings of some of Stevens' more difficult poems; but Jarraway's over­
arching attempt to relocate Stevens' humanism within postructuralism's linguistic abyss 
seems unnecessary in light of the skepticism and careful attention with which Stevens' 
searched for a tenable humanism throughout his poetic career. 
In Wallace Stevens: Imagination and Faith, one of the first book-length 
investigations of Stevens' poetic engagement with religion, Morris provides a 
comprehensive analysis of Stevens' attempt to write poetry that could "take the place of 
'empty heaven and its hymns.' [...] Again and again he described poetry as a 'sanction' 
for life: poetry decrees our cosmic isolation, at once a curse and a nobility" (3). Morris 
is justified in arguing for the importance of poetry's function as a sanctioning force for 
Stevens, a function repeatedly confirmed in his prose; "Life without poetry is, in effect, 
life without a sanction" (L 299); "everything depends on its sanction; and when its 
sanction is lost that is the end of it. But the poem is precisely what is printed on the page. 
The poem is the absence of the archbishop" (L 347-48); "I know exactly why I write 
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poetry [...]. I write it because for me it is one of the sanctions of hfe" (L 600); "the poets 
[...] urgently search the world for the sanctions of life, for that which makes life so 
prodigiously worth living" (OP 228); "the end of the poet is fulfillment, since the poet 
finds a sanction for life in poetry" (NA 43). An understanding of Stevens' concept of 
sanctioning is crucial to an understanding of his poetry, and I will return to this concept 
in the next chapter. 
Morris also argues that despite Stevens' concern with religion, his "role is not to 
be found in morals": for Stevens, "Ethics need not offer a prescriptive code of behavior" 
(144). This contention is supported in "The Noble Rider and the Sound of Words," 
where Stevens admits that "if a social movement moved one deeply enough, its moving 
poems would follow"; but he does not see himself as being involved in such a movement: 
I am interested in the role of the poet and this is paramount. In this area of 
my subject I might be expected to speak of the social, that is to say 
sociological or political, obligations of the poet. He has none. [...] I do 
not think that a poet owes any more as a social obligation than he owes as 
a moral obligation, and [...] the role of the poet is not to be found in 
morals. (NA 27-28) 
For Stevens, "the social," and by implication moral "obligations so closely urged is a 
phase of the pressure of reality which a poet [...] is bound to resist or evade today"; or, in 
a more blunt statement to the same effect, "No politician," or priest for that matter, "can 
command the imagination, directing it to do this or that" (NA 28). 
In a chapter entitled "The Deaf Mute Church and the Chapel of Breath," Morris 
contends that while Stevens could not accept a repeated return to the orthodox churches 
of an earlier time, the "goal of Stevens' critique of the deaf-mute church is [an] escape 
from repetition into the moment of vibrant potentiality" (50), a moment which Morris 
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describes in a later chapter as arising from "the dynamic relationship" between "the 
imagination" and "the physical world" (142): "each act in the world is potentially 
sacramental, a sign of spiritual reality and a means to spiritual grace, and each place 
emerging in his description becomes potentially [...] a place where, for a moment, 
imagination meets and marries reality" (169). Morris argues that such moments result 
from an active receptivity of the type described in "How to Live. What to Do." The plot 
of this poem is straightforward: two men stop to rest as they ascend a ridge, and during 
their rest they perceive "the heroic height" of the rock on which they stand as well as the 
"heroic sound / Joyous and jubilant and sure" that is produced by "the cold wind" (CP 
126). As Morris suggests, and as is usually the case with Stevens, such an experience 
begins with receptivity to "the mysterious callings of Nature" (L 59), but only becomes 
an example of how to live and what to do when the imagination is married to sensory 
perception through apt description; as Stevens says elsewhere, "Description is 
revelation" (CP 344). In this particular poem, the men set out in the evening "To seek a 
sun of fuller fire. / Instead there was this tufted rock" (CP 125). As Stevens immediately 
begins to describe the rock—"Massively rising high and bare / Beyond all trees, the 
ridges thrown / Like giant arms among the clouds"—it becomes apparent that the "sun of 
fuller fire" (CP 125) is precisely the imagination and its "desire, set deep in the eye" (CP 
467) as it successfully marries itself to massive rock and cold wind through metaphorical 
description. The rock is part of the earth, and yet its verticality, its position "Beyond" all 
earth-bound plant life, and its personified magnitude among clouds indicates that the 
earth can accommodate the poet's desire for transcendence. Significantly, in "Christian 
iconography, the rock represents the revealed truth of Christ promised by the church" 
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(Morris 139); for Stevens, the rock comes to represent the revealed truth of the earth 
promised by poetry: "Founded in the physical being of the earth as the chapel of breath 
is founded in man's physical being, the rock embodies the interchange of environment 
and self, visible and invisible, reality and imagination which is, for Stevens, the essence 
of poetry" (Morris 141). Stevens believed that the revelatory, ritual space of the church 
had lost its power to provide the sanctions on which everything depends; but its function 
remains necessary, and therefore must be relocated within a poetry of the earth. 
Morris's study of Stevens' engagement with religion and faith is thorough, but 
she does not exhaust the topic. Although Morris alludes to the Romantic influence on 
some of Stevens' major poetic conceptions, she frames Stevens' engagement with 
religion largely in biographical terms: Stevens enacted a poetic transvaluation of 
Christian values, Morris argues, primarily because he grew up with a strong Protestant 
heritage, read deeply in the Bible, and absorbed a great deal of Christian theology; as a 
poet, this experience allowed him to retain, secularize, and rearticulate what orthodox 
Christianity had once provided for its followers. This focus allows Morris to analyze 
Stevens' transvaluation of specific Christian concepts—such as a re-imagined version of 
the Trinity—^that cannot be covered within the scope of this thesis. While Morris's 
Christian-centered approach is valid and illuminating, Stevens' engagement with religion 
can be placed within a long lineage of English poetry, and can be read within a broader, 
more comparative religious context. Such an approach is useful because it clarifies one 
of Morris's central arguments: again and again she emphasizes the central importance of 
a sacramental marriage between imagination and reality in Stevens' poems. This 
emphasis is justified, but Morris never offers a comprehensive theory that explains how 
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this aspect of Stevens' poetry—^his absolute reliance on, and particular understanding of, 
the interdependence between imagination and reality—can be understood within the 
larger context of both English poetry and religious history. One of the goals of this thesis 
will be to show how is it that Stevens might have arrived at this vital concept as he 
attempted to write poetry that could serve as a valid substitute for orthodox religion. 
In Wallace Stevens and the Question of Belief, Jarraway begins with a critique of 
humanistic substitution, which he describes as "the objective truth of God gradually 
collaps[ing] into the subjective truth of the poet only as the individual mind" (12).^ 
Jarraway points out that in Stevens' letter to Hi Simons concerning "some substitute for 
religion," Stevens goes on to say that "Humanism would be the natural substitute, but the 
more I see of humanism the less I like it" (L 348). According to Jarraway, "Stevens' 
point here is that the foreclosure of spiritual experience in the matter of faith has not 
really altered to any significant degree if orthodoxy's transcendent theism is merely 
exchanged for its antinomian variation in an immanent humanism" (5). Jarraway 
suggests that when Stevens says, "'The poetry that created the idea of God will either 
adapt it to our different intelligence, or create a substitute for it, or make it uimecessaiy,' 
[...] the 'either' in Stevens' notation [...] makes it fairly plain that there are actually only 
two alternatives worthy of serious consideration" (3). Jarraway argues that despite what 
Stevens says in the letter, the options presented by Stevens' either/or proposition do not 
^ It should be pointed out that the notion of mere substitution, or the simple deification of the subjective 
imagination in a post-Christian worid, is itself a reductive oversimplification that has sometimes been 
posited as a way to understand, and usually to undermine, "the Romantic endeavor to salvage traditional 
[religious] experience and values by accommodating them to premises tenable to a later age" (Abrams 69). 
In The Mirror and the Lamp and Natural Supematuralism, M.H. Abrams thoroughly and convincingly 
demonstrates that the Romantic attempt to salvage religious experience (as well as Stevens' similar attempt 
to provide a transvaluation of religious values) is, in fact, much more nuanced than mere "substitution" 
suggests. 
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mean the same thing. He goes on to introduce "One of the first principles of [his] study" 
by suggesting that he will "pay close attention to the sense of altemativeness between a 
differing, or differentiating intelligence, on the one hand, and an intelligence more 
conveniently predisposed to substituting or replacing ideas offered to it in the whole 
relation between imagination and faith, on the other" (3). In the course of his study, 
Jarraway suggests that one of the major developments in Stevens' poetry, as it evolves 
from its early stages in Harmonium and Ideas of Order through to its later stages in 
Transport to Summer, The Auroras of Autumn, and The Rock, involves a movement first 
toward a belief in humanistic substitution, then away from that belief and toward a 
differing intelligence that Jarraway terms a/theology, which he locates in Stevens' poetry 
after "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction." 
Jarraway argues that in the second phase of this movement, "when belief ceases to 
be either a subject or an object of thought and becomes instead the question of thought 
[...] itself, then what constitutes meaning for the poet begins to take on far greater 
significance than the actual meanings of his poems" (183). Following an argument 
postulated by M. H. Abrams in The Mirror and the Lamp, Jarraway sets up a structural 
dichotomy "of what [Roland] Barthes might call 'the great semiological "versus" myth': 
mimesis / poiesis" (12), which arises from the opposition between "orthodoxy's 
transcendent theism" and "immanent humanism" (5). According to Jarraway, the High 
Romantic notion of poiesis—adopted to varying degrees by modernists—causes "a poet 
like Wallace Stevens" to "either approbate or at some point register his disenchantment 
with classic deduction posing as romantic induction" (12). "It should not surprise us," 
Jarraway continues, "to find Stevens midway though his poetic career writing about the 
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romantic in 'a pejorative sense,' as he phrases it, about 'some phase of the romantic that 
has become stale' and that he views in his letters as leading to 'fatalism and then to 
indifferentism'" (12). Jarraway fails to point out that Stevens believed all poetic fictions, 
including those of the Romantics, would inevitably become stale and need to be re-
imagined. Stevens may have grown weary of particular Romantic tropes, but there is 
little indication that he rejected outright the major tenets of the Romantic project. 
Jarraway argues that because neither classical mimesis nor romantic poiesis could 
sustain Stevens' poetic project, he was forced to turn to 
a third idea [...] that is thoroughly poststructural and thoroughly 
postmodern. It is this third idea [...] that turns the poet's objective quest 
for faith not into subjective art but rather into the eventful question of 
belief and traces a continual pattern of spiritual rebirth spiraling through 
his last three collections of verse. (13) 
Jarraway's term for this "eventfiil question of belief is "semiosis," an "invented term" 
(13) which he uses variously to suggest a pastiche of philosophical and critical ideas: 
Nietzsche's "discursive, rather than substantive, possibilities for maintaining 'the 
satisfactions of belief" (9); Marin Heidegger's "force of an Other" (13); Barthes' idea of 
textuality; Michel Foucault's notion of discourse; and, primarily, Jaques Derrida's "'force 
of the question'" (14). According to Jarraway, Stevens' development can be read as "an 
important realigimient of linguistic and aesthetic priorities [...] that allows belief to pass 
from a literal quest to a figural question" (17), a necessary adjustment since, for Stevens, 
"a dark abyss has swallowed up all the available spiritual options" (18). Jarraway 
summarizes his thesis as follows: 
Stevens [...] reach[es] into that abyss, not so much to deliver us up [...] to 
another meaning and another truth but, like his Metaphysician in the Dark, 
rhetorically to suspend the question of belief over the abyss as a question 
29 
of style. "[It] becomes the question of style as the question of writing," as 
Derrida would say, "the question of a spuming operation, more powerful 
than any content, any thesis, any meaning ... [and] considered as a 
question ... remains, interminably." [...] The really valuable insight that 
Stevens' interrogation of faith will ultimately be able to show is not so 
much what can and cannot be thought once theological representation has 
reached its limits but rather what makes that thought and those limits 
possible in the first place. (18-19) 
At the close of his study, after bringing a wide range of postmetaphysical thought, 
poststructural criticism, and postmodern theory to bear on Stevens' body of work, 
Jarraway concludes that Stevens' "form of belief," equated with a collection of poetry 
that can only reveal the limits of belief, "will never count for more than the force of its 
question" (315)—a conclusion intended by Jarraway to convey high praise. 
Jarraway's study adds philosophical depth and critical complexity to a project 
initiated by earlier deconstructive readers of Stevens' poetry, most notably J. Hillis 
Miller, who, in his essay "Stevens' Rock and Criticism as Cure," investigates the ultimate 
indeterminacy of certain key words in "The Rock" to argue that the poem, finally, 
is an abyss and the filling of the abyss, a chasm and a chasmy production 
of icons of the chasm, inexhaustible to interpretation. Its textual richness 
opens abyss beneath abyss, beneath each deep a deeper deep, as the reader 
interrogates its elements and lets each question generate an answer which 
is another question in its turn. Each question opens another distance, [...] 
without ever reaching any closer to the constantly receding horizon. (49) 
Stevens undeniably embraces flux and avoids the stasis of closure in his poems. In his 
prose, Stevens explicitly warns readers not to search for rational certainty in his poems, 
as a brief essay from 1948 entitled "Poetry and Meaning" makes clear: 
things [such as poems] that have their origin in the imagination or in the 
emotions very often take on a form that is ambiguous or uncertain. It is 
not possible to attach a single, rational meaning to such things without 
destroying the imaginative or emotional ambiguity or uncertainty that is 
inherent in them and that is why poets do not like to explain. (OP 249) 
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However, despite the fact that a certain degree of uncertainty is central to Stevens' 
poetry, Jarraway's conclusion—that Stevens' poetry, as it repeatedly and variously poses 
the question of belief, can "never count for more than the force of [that] question" 
(315)—finally obscures more than it illuminates because it refiises to acknowledge or 
account for the affirmations that can potentially rise fi-om the abyss, or the sanctions for 
being that Stevens sometimes celebrates by employing a secularized ritual structure in his 
poems. 
In "The Ultimate Poem is Abstract," Stevens sheds light on the meaning that can, 
in fact, emerge fi-om the force of a question. The poem first poses a central question— 
"This day writhes with what?"—^which, in its non-specificity, is intended not to elicit an 
answer, but to mark the space of the poem as distinct from the writhing day itself The 
poem then describes a type of stock character—"The lecturer / On This Beautiful World 
Of Ours"— who, always ready with certain metaphysical answers, "composes himself / 
And hems the planet rose and haws it ripe, / And red, and right" (CP 429). Stevens' tone 
becomes mocking as the capitalized lecture's formal certainty is undermined by the 
informal uncertainty of the hemming and hawing that implicitly ensues. With the 
lecturer's certainty undermined, the alliteration of "rose," "ripe," "red," and "right" 
suggests that any certain answer to the poem's question will only add to the alliteration 
by being wrong. Near the end of the poem, Stevens concedes, albeit somewhat 
ironically, that "It would be enough / If we were ever, just once, at the middle, fixed / In 
This Beautiful World Of Ours" (CP 430). If this middle can be achieved, however, it 
carmot be achieved through poetry, where we are always "Writhing in wrong obliques 
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and distances" and "Helplessly at the edge," a suspended state which prevents us from 
feeling "Complete" and "merely enjoy[ing]" the day (CP 430). In other words, the 
ultimate poem would, if only it could, fix us in the enjoyable, non-abstract middle of each 
day's immanent writhings. However, in order for a poem to fix us in those writhings, the 
writhings themselves must in some way be named or figured, which implies that the 
poem will always, implicitly if not explicitly, pose some variant of the question, "This 
day writhes with what?" (CP 429). "If the day writhes," then when those writhings are 
invited into the poem via its question, the day does not writhe "with revelations. / One 
goes on asking questions" (CP 429). Consequently, the poet can never achieve the 
certainty of the lecturer. The poem continues to armounce itself as distinct from the day's 
writhings, and to disrupt our unquestioning belief in, and certain enjoyment of, any 
supposed sense of immanent completion. For Stevens, this is why "The particular 
question—^here / The particular answer to the particular question / Is not in point—the 
question is in point" (CP 429). 
Jarraway would have us stop at this point where the question disrupts the smug 
certainty of the poem's lecturer and casts doubt over the static certainty of any meaning; 
but the "question is in point" precisely because the question itself is transformative: one 
may go on asking questions, but "So said, this placid space / Is changed" (CP 429). And 
what is the nature of this placid space once it is transformed by the poem's inevitable 
question? 
It is not so blue as we thought. To be blue. 
There must be no questions. It is an intellect 
Of windings round and dodges to and fro, 
Writhings in wrong obliques and distances, 
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Not an intellect in which we are fleet; present 
Everywhere in space at once, cloud-pole 
Of communication. (CP 429-430). 
The immediate, intense perception of the sky's color fades somewhat as soon as we ask 
questions about it instead of merely experiencing it as a sensory fact; but an 
unquestioning, immanent engagement with the day, if ever we were to achieve such a 
state in actuality, would make us "fleet," which could mean nimble or quick, but also 
evanescent, or likely to disappear altogether. In the absence of the question that marks 
the space of the poem and allows communicative thought to take place, the immanence of 
"Everywhere in space at once" would lead to the "cloud-pole," or dark terminus, "Of 
communication" itself, and we would be relegated to a silent and therefore meaningless, 
non-human existence. 
The question that opens "The Ultimate Poem is Abstract" is not, strictly speaking, 
the eventful questioning of belief that Jarraway finds throughout Stevens' later poetry; 
but there is a direct parallel between the poem's question and Jarraway's question of 
belief in that the poem's question opens an abyss between the subjective observer and the 
objective world. Morris calls this abyss "our cosmic isolation, at once a curse and a 
nobility" (3). It is a curse insofar as it distances us from an immanent participation in the 
world's writhing; but it is a nobility in that it allows for what Joseph Riddel terms "the 
origin of consciousness," which is also "the birth of the imagination"; "man grown 
conscious of himself wills to name the world, to possess it as it once possessed him. He 
wills the 'I am' of poem one, and in willing it completes his fall into an alien world. The 
paradox is this; without self-consciousness there is no poetry, no need for the fiction 
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which marries self with world" (Morris 160). In "Saint John and the Back-Ache," 
Stevens succinctly summarizes both the abyss and its value when he says that the 
"illustrations" of poetic metaphor "help us face the dumbfoundering abyss / Between us 
and the object, external cause, / The little ignorance that is everything" (CP 437). In the 
strict sense of oiir desire, we like to think it would "be enough / If we were ever, just 
once, at the middle, fixed / In This Beautiful World Of Ours" (CP 430); but if this desire 
was ever realized, it would lead to the closure of the "dumbfoundering abyss," to the loss 
of the impetus for poetry, and, like the disappearance of the gods, to the loss of life's 
sanctions, or to emptiness and annihilation. 
Jarraway, then, is not entirely incorrect when he argues that the "force of [the] 
question" is vital to Stevens' poetry; but he goes too far when he says that the "form of 
belief in Stevens' poetry "will never count for more than the force of its question" (315). 
By framing his study within the deconstructive skepticism of poststructural critique, 
Jarraway unjustly mitigates the structural significance of the question itself. The question 
of belief does not only open abyss after abyss, but also provides the possibility for poetry 
to yield up momentary bridges that transcend the abyss and allow us, however fieetingly, 
to celebrate "the marriage of flesh and air" (CP 83). This marriage is different from 
being "at the middle, fixed / In This Beautifiil World Of Ours" (CP 430), because the 
image of a downed tree's stump defines the middle of "Life is Motion," the early poem in 
which this marriage of flesh and air takes place. As Robert Pack has suggested in an 
essay entitled "Place and Nothingness in the Poetry of Wallace Stevens," the "motion of 
life" in this poem is "to be seen as inseparable from the stasis of death" (104). Bonnie 
and Josie, the characters in the poem who celebrate their momentary marriage with the 
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air, are not immanently fixed in this marriage; rather, they are able to be thrust into the 
motion of a marriage celebration precisely because the stump makes them self-conscious, 
or aware of their own mortality, at the same time that it clears a human space in the 
natural world, distancing them fi-om immanent fixedness in an imbroken forest. This 
consciousness and this space—their very separateness from the earth—does not simply 
spurn them into an extended, postmodern, semiotic contemplation of abyss upon abyss. 
More importantly, it gives them cause to avow and rejoice in their subsequent sacrament 
with the earth's air; at the end of the poem, they are thrust into affirmative celebration, 
dancing as they rapturously sing '"Ohoyaho, / Ohoo'..(CP 83). 
35 
2. 
"I WISH THAT GROVES STILL WERE SACRED" 
"The Noble Rider and the Sound of Words," an essay Stevens composed in the 
early 1940's, is organized around the concept of nobility. Stevens imbues the quality of 
nobility with the quality of transcendence in such a way that nobility can be understood 
as a secular trope with religious cormotations. Stevens says of the poet that "his function 
is to make his imagination [his readers'] and that he fulfills himself only as he sees his 
imagination become the light in the minds of others" (NA 29). This description of the 
poet's function follows the common pattern of evasiveness and ambiguity that 
characterizes much of Stevens' prose; but even here he is not far fi-om implicitly giving 
the poet a non-institutionalized religious role appropriate to his time and place. As he 
works to clarify the role of the poet, he describes what the poet's imagination offers as it 
"becomes the light in the mind of others": "the imagination gives to everything that it 
touches a peculiarity, and it seems to me that the peculiarity of the imagination is 
nobility, of which there are many degrees. This inherent nobility is the natural source of 
another [...]. I mean that nobility which is our spiritual height and depth" (NA 33-34, 
emphasis mine). According to Stevens' argument, the poet's imagination takes on an 
unorthodox though unmistakably religious characteristic: whatever comes into contact 
with the imagination is made noble, and this process of ennobling leads to the only 
available transcendence in an age of disbelief 
As the essay concludes, Stevens uses the pivotal notion of sanctioning to 
assemble the relationship between the poet's proper function and nobility's affirmative 
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power: "For the sensitive poet, conscious of negations, nothing is more difficult than the 
affirmations of nobility and yet there is nothing that he requires of himself more 
persistently, since in them and in their kind, alone, are to be found those sanctions that 
are the reasons for his being" (NA 35, emphasis mine). For a critic like Jarraway, 
consciousness of negations is all that Stevens hopes to achieve in his later poems; Stevens 
insists, however, that the poet must strive to provide affirmations, even while remaining 
conscious of negation's persistence. In other words, everything that is conceived 
adequately by the imagination is not simply negated as the limits of meaning are 
revealed, but is potentially made noble, or sanctioned, by that very process. Because 
Stevens attributes to nobility a quality of spiritual height and depth, which implies the 
verticality of transcendence, nobility becomes one of Stevens' major tropes for a secular, 
post-Christian rearticulation of the religious content of poetry. 
A sanction is, most generally, a formal decree, especially an ecclesiastical decree. 
Since Stevens was concerned that "the strength of the church [had grown] less and less 
until the church [stood] for little more than propriety," and since, as a result of this 
concern, "it [became] a habit of mind with [him] to be thinking of some substitute for 
religion" (L 348), it is fitting that he describes the poet in terms of the sanctions that can 
be provided within the formal space of the poem. Etymologically, "sanction" is derived 
from the Latin verb sancire—^to make sacred—and is closely related to the Latin sacrare, 
which gives rise to the English words "sacred," "consecrate," and "sacrament." 
In a journal entry from 1906, Stevens describes yet another evening spent in a 
church; 
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Full litany—sweet and melodious and welcome. They should have dark 
comers there. Impossible to be religious in a pew. One should have a 
great nave, quiet lights, a remote voice, a soft choir and solitude. [...] 
Sometimes I think that all of our learning is the little learning of the 
maxim. To laugh at a Roman awe-stricken in a sacred grove is to laugh at 
something to-day. I wish that groves still were sacred—or, at least that 
something was: that there was still something free from doubt, that day 
unto day still uttered speech and night unto night still showed wisdom. I 
grow tired of the want of faith—the instinct of faith. (L 86) 
In the church's pew, Stevens cannot fulfill his nostalgic longing for something "sacred," 
or "something free from doubt"; and, despite the fact that he grows tired of what he terms 
"the instinct of faith," instincts are inherent impulses or unalterable tendencies, and 
therefore are unavoidable (L 86). Modem man, armed with the insufficient knowledge 
provided by his axiomatic beliefs, is all too willing to deny this instinct by laughing 
scomftilly "at a Roman awe-stricken in a sacred grove," and fails to realize that his 
compensatory scom is directed at his own burden of doubt (L 86). Stevens understands 
this irony and refrises to add his voice to the laughter; but neither can he join in the litany 
from the orthodox position of the Christ Church pew. Instead, with the words "They 
should," he begins to compose a place where his instinct for faith might be more fully 
realized. In his journal entry this place tums out to be not much different from the church 
in which he finds himself Soon, however, Stevens would come to view the imagination 
and the poems it produces as the composed space that in "the absence of the archbishop" 
(L 348) could produce "the sanctions of life," or "that which makes life so prodigiously 
worth living" (OP 228). 
By the end of his life, Stevens would place the poetic process of sanctioning in "a 
chapel of breath" (CP 529), a replacement for the "deaf-mute" (CP 357) churches of 
traditional religions. A chapel, as a metaphor for a religious place of worship, is 
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traditionally the site of ritual occurrences; it is the site where the lives of believers are 
ritualistically sanctioned, and it provides the delineated space in which sacraments take 
place. Though Stevens refers specifically to "ritual" only once in his poetry, his 
preference of Catholicism over Protestantism,^ along with his repeated allusions to 
churches and cathedrals, to the poet as priest, to the sacrament of marriage, and to the 
sanctions provided by poetry, work together to suggest that Stevens' poetry, as a tenable 
substitute for religion, must provide a structural setting similar to that which ritual spaces 
traditionally provided, and must function in much the same way that ritual had functioned 
within such a setting. 
The challenge, then, is to find a theoretical framework within which Stevens' 
poetry can be understood as composed ritual space, or as a space in which the sanctioning 
of life can occur, without making its sanctions appear to be certain, unchanging 
pronouncements "On This Beautiful World Of Ours" (CP 429). As many of the previous 
examples indicate, Stevens' understanding of religion—including his idea of God and his 
concern with belief—^was not limited to Christianity. Stevens maintained a comparative 
attitude toward the world's religions, viewing all of them that he encountered in his 
studies and in his life as necessary fictions, or imaginative human constructs, that were 
relative to specific historical times and geographical places. Consequently, an 
understanding of Stevens' poetry as ritual space calls for a broadly comparative, 
constructivist theory of ritual. 
'in his letters, Stevens mentions frequent visits to Catholic cathedrals, where he liked to sit and meditate; in 
Peter Brazeau's Parts of a World: Wallace Stevens Remembered, Stevens is cited by a close friend as 
saying that if he ever joined a church it would be the Catholic Church (291); and the Rev. Arthur Hanley, 
who was the chaplain at the hospital where Stevens died, claims to have baptized him into the Catholic 
Church shortly before he died (294-96). 
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Such a theory can be found in Jonathan Z. Smith's To Take Place: Toward 
Theory in Ritual. According to Smith, 
Ritual is, first and foremost, a mode of paying attention. It is a process for 
marking interest. It is the recognition of this fundamental characteristics 
of ritual that most sharply distinguish our understanding from that of the 
Reformers, with their all to easy equation of ritual with blind and 
thoughtless habit. It is this characteristic, as well, that explains the role of 
place as a fundamental component of ritual; place directs attention. 
Such a preliminary understanding of ritual and its relation to place 
is best illustrated by the case of built ritual environments—most 
especially, crafted constructions such as temples. When one enters a 
temple, one enters a marked-off space [...] in which, at least in principle, 
nothing is accidental; everything, at least potentially, demands attention. 
The temple serves as a focusing lens, establishing the possibility of 
significance by directing attention, by requiring the perception of 
difference. (104) 
These observations, when considered in light of Stevens' concern with the poem as 
delineated space, work to make sense of two seemingly distinct ideas that Stevens 
proposed at about the same time; in a letter to Hi Simons, Stevens argues that "The 
major poetic idea in the world is and always has been the idea of God" (377); in the 
"Adagia," Stevens argues that "There is no difference between god and his temple" (OP 
191). If the major poetic idea always has been the idea of God, and if there is no 
difference between god and his temple, then one could say, following Stevens, that the 
major poetic idea always has been the idea of the temple, or the idea of the ritual space 
where the commonplace is made noble. 
Stevens clearly believed that within the space of the poem ordinary life is 
sanctioned. He likely would have been uncomfortable equating "sanctioned" with "made 
sacred"; but Stevens lived during a time when Emile Durkheim's comparative theory of 
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religion had made "the Sacred" a substantive category, a theory that contradicts Smith's 
(and Stevens') constructivist leanings: 
Within the temple, the ordinary [...] becomes significant, becomes 
"sacred," simply by being there. A ritual object or action becomes sacred 
by having attention focused on it in a highly marked way. From such a 
point of view, there is nothing that is inherently sacred or profane. These 
are not substantive categories, but rather situational ones. Sacrality is, 
above all, a category of emplacement. [...] We do well to remember that 
long before "the Sacred" appeared in discourse as a substantive (a usage 
that does not antedate Durkheim), it was primarily employed in verbal 
forms, most especially with the sense of making an individual a king or 
bishop (as in the obsolete English verbs to sacrate or to sacre), or in 
adjectival forms denoting the result of the process of sacration. Ritual is 
not an expression of or a response to "the Sacred"; rather, something or 
someone is made sacred by ritual [...]. [DJivine and himian, sacred and 
profane, are transitive categories; they serve as maps and labels, not 
substances; they are distinctions of office, indices of difference. (104-105) 
In this passage, if the overtly religious terminology is replaced with Stevensian terms, we 
are left with a statement that describes Stevens' poetry with remarkable accuracy: In the 
imagination, and subsequently in the poem, the ordinary gains nobility, or becomes 
sanctioned, simply by being there. A poetic object or action becomes sanctioned by 
having attention focused on it in a highly marked way. From such a point of view, there 
is nothing that is inherently sanctioned or unsanctioned, noble or ignoble. These are not 
substantive categories, but rather situational ones. Sanctioning is, above all, a category of 
emplacement. Imaginative, poetic creation is not an expression of or a response to "the 
Noble"; rather, something or someone is made noble and thereby sanctioned, first by the 
imagination, and subsequently by the poem. Noble and ignoble are transitive categories; 
they serve as maps and labels, not substances; they are distinctions of office, indices of 
difference. 
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That Stevens believed nothing to be inherently sacred or profane is evidenced in 
"Montrachet-Le-Jardin," where he describes in ritualistic terms a poetic process that 
allows the poet to make "A hero's world in which he is the hero" (CP 261). As "the x 
malisons of other men" are left behind, "The poison in the blood will have been purged" 
by 
An inner miracle and sun-sacrament, 
One of the major miracles, that fall 
As apples fall, without astronomy, 
One of the sacraments between two breaths. 
Magical only for the change they make. (CP 261-62) 
The "inner miracle" in this passage is compared to the natural process of sun-ripened 
apples falling from a tree; but "as" makes the falling apples metaphorical, suggesting that 
the natural fact of the apples falling gains the divinity of a "sun-sacrament" only when it 
is placed in the poem. The wise poet-hero does not need the astronomical guidance of 
the star of Bethlehem to be purged of sin, because the inherent sacredness attributed to 
the major miracle of Christ's birth is part of the poison that must be purged if the new 
world of poetic sacraments is to be brought into existence. The magic that results in the 
sacramental poetic act is not inherent in any particular words, historical events, or natural 
objects; rather, the natural fact of the falling apples, like every other natural fact, becomes 
divine when the poet sees the event between breaths, and then breathes the words of 
metaphor into existence, so that "Magical" is "only" a label that indicates difference—in 
this case the "change" brought about by the words of the poem as they are breathed into 
existence by the poet. 
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The parallels between Smith's theory of ritual and Stevens' theory of poetry are 
extended as Smith expands upon his theory, and it will be helpful to readers unfamiliar 
with Smith's theory of ritual to quote him at length: 
Ritual is, above all, an assertion of difference. [...] Ritual represents the 
creation of a controlled environment where the variables (the accidents) of 
ordinary life may be displaced precisely because they are felt to be so 
overwhelmingly present and powerful. Ritual is a means of performing 
the way things ought to be in conscious tension with the way things are. 
Ritual relies for its power on the fact that it is concerned with quite 
ordinary activities placed within an extraordinary setting, that what it 
describes and displays is, in principle, possible for every occurrence of 
these acts. But it also relies for its power on the perceived fact that, in 
actuality, such possibilities cannot be realized. There is a "gnostic" 
dimension to ritual. It provides the means for demonstrating that we know 
what ought to have been done, what ought to have taken place. 
Nonetheless, by the very fact that it is ritual action rather than everyday 
action, ritual demonstrates that we know "what is the case." Ritual thus 
provides an occasion for reflection on and rationalization of the fact that 
what ought to have been done was not, what ought to have taken place did 
not. From such a perspective, ritual is not best imderstood as congruent 
with something else—a magical imitation of desired ends, a translation of 
emotions, a symbolic acting out of ideas [...]. Ritual gains force where 
incongruency is perceived and thought about. (109-110) 
This theory of ritual can be usefully applied to Stevens' poetry, and particularly to his 
major late poems, which can be understood as extraordinary efforts to create non-
orthodox, imaginative ritual spaces where the commonplace is temporarily made noble 
through a secularized version of a traditionally religious process. 
When considering Stevens' poetry from The Auroras of Autumn to "The Rock," 
critics tend to focus on his well-known delineation between the imagination and reality. 
Too often these critics conclude, implicitly if not explicitly, that late in Stevens' life he 
finally adhered to one or the other. Depending on a critic's inclinations, Stevens 
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ultimately becomes either a poet of the imagination or a poet of reality."^ Stevens' first 
significant articulation of this duality appears in "The Noble Rider and the Sound of 
Words," where he attempts to define "the relation between the imagination and reality" 
(NA 7). In this relation, there is no choice according to Stevens; rather, "the universal 
interdependence exists, and hence [the poet's] choice and his decision must be that [the 
imagination and reality] are equal and inseparable" (NA 24). Stevens' idea that the 
imagination and reality are ultimately interdependent is closely related to Smith's theory 
of ritual, in which "Ritual gains force where incongruency is perceived and thought 
about" without being overcome (110). In the same way that ritual gains force through the 
interdependence of what ought to be done and what is actually the case, Stevens' late 
poems gain force through the interdependence of imagination's "ought to" and reality's 
"is," and not between a choice of one over the other. 
Stevens also contends in "The Noble Rider" that poetry results fi-om placement. 
As in ritual, the poet places quite ordinary activities (reality) within an extraordinary 
setting (the imagination), a process that results in the poem; "his own measure as a poet, 
in spite of all the passions of all the lovers of the truth, is the measure of his power to 
abstract himself, and to withdraw with him into his abstraction the reality on which the 
lovers of truth insist. He must be able to abstract himself and also to abstract reality, 
which he does by placing it in his imagination" (23). The poet must be able to abstract 
himself in order to recognize that he is something more than an empirical body; the 
imagination is itself an abstraction, serving as the site of our capacity to form conceptions 
'' For a full discussion of this critical tendency, see the introductory chapter to B.J Legget's Wallace Stevens 
and Poetic Theory. 
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distinct from purely physical or empirical sensations. For Stevens, any reality outside the 
imagination can then be placed within this ordering, conceptual space where it is 
sanctioned by the addition of poetic meaning, just as ordinary objects can be placed 
within the ordering space of a ritual environment where they are sanctified by the 
addition of religious meaning. 
This act of placement is captured succinctly in "Anecdote of the Jar," an early 
poem that begins with the simple statement "I placed ajar in Tennessee" (CP 76). The 
act of placement must first take place in the poet's imagination, so that the jar placed in 
Tennessee also comes to be placed in the poem. This placement then orders the 
unordered wilderness: "It made the slovenly wilderness / surround that hill." Stevens 
captures the constructive nature of this act when he says that the jar "took dominion 
everywhere," stressing its newly sanctioned nobility, even though considered as an 
empirical object it "was gray and bare." This act of ennobling placement is closely 
related to ritual acts; for Stevens, the built environment of the temple is replaced by the 
built environment of the poem, the orthodox process of sacration is replaced by the poetic 
process of sanctioning, and the resulting experience of the religiously sacred is replaced 
by the experience of the poetically noble. 
Smith's description of the ways ritual should not be understood is also relevant to 
Stevens' poetry. In Words Chosen out of Desire, Helen Vendler defends her over­
arching critical approach to Stevens' poetry against critics who read Stevens' poems as "a 
collection of ideas" (4). Because so many of Stevens' poems address the subject of 
poetry itself, and because his later poems make increasing use of abstract diction (as 
opposed to the concrete sensuality that dominates Harmonium), it is indeed tempting to 
45 
focus on the ideas they contain. But while Vendler remains one of Stevens' best readers, 
she often reacts to idea-oriented critics by going too far in the other direction and reading 
Stevens' poems almost wholly as translations of emotions. This leads Vendler to read 
"An Ordinary Evening in New Haven" as a "resolutely impoverished poem" that "sets a 
desolate scene" and that "cannot hope, xmder these conditions, to overcome entirely the 
exhaustion and despair that motivate it. It is, humanly speaking, the saddest of all 
Stevens' poems" (Extended 269). While "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven" does 
confront "the total leaflessness," "The dominant blank," and "the wasted figurations of 
the wastes" (CP 477), the poem also insists that "The barrenness that appears is an 
exposing" of the "visibility of thought, / In which hundreds of eyes, in one mind, see at 
once" (CP 487-88). These lines call to mind Emerson's invisible eyeball, and they do not 
sound solely desperate, exhausted, or sad. The "thought" that gains "visibility" in such a 
poem is precisely the thought of incongruency—the acute perception of the difference 
between our unending desire for the way things ought to be and our unflinching 
knowledge of the way things are. This poem, like many of Stevens' late 
accomplishments, is both more than a symbolic acting out of ideas and more than a 
translation of emotions; it is, above all else, an extraordinarily moving attempt to 
represent poetry's ennobling sanctions by perceiving and thinking about the 
incongruency between the "savagery" of "plain things," or reality, and its "diviner 
opposite," or the metaphorical constructs that the imagination makes of plain reality (CP 
468). 
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I will return to Smith's theory of ritual in my subsequent analysis of particular 
poems. Before moving on to a more in-depth study of specific poems and specific 
applications of this theory, it is helpful to understand, from an historical rather than a 
biographical perspective, how the idea of ritual might have found its way into Stevens' 
poetry. Today the idea of ritual is oftentimes dismissed as unworthy of serious academic 
attention unless the ritual in question raises anthropologically loaded questions 
concerning sex or sacrifice. This negative preconception arises from the fact that since 
the reformation, ritual has been scorned by Protestant religious scholars, and "ritual" 
tends to appear in the English language primarily as an object of derision. Smith captures 
this bias by noting citations of historical usage in the Oxford English Dictionary, shortly 
after the Reformation gained strength in Europe, Smith says, 
a new language was brought into being with respect to ritual. Rather than 
some rituals being "idolatrous," that is, false, one could speak of all rituals 
as being "only" or "merely symbolic." Thus [...] Ritual could be 
perceived as a matter of surface rather than depth; of outward 
representation rather than inward transformation. It was a matter of "bare 
ceremoniousnesse" (1583); "it is onlie a ceremonie" (1693), a "mere 
ceremony" (1759). As such, ritual was to be classed with superstition 
(shallow, unreasoning action) or with habit (costumary, repetitive, 
thoughtless action). "Let vs not come to y'. Chirche by vse & custome as 
the Oxe to his Stalle" (1526). Although this language might be directed 
by Protestant authors against "Jewish" or "Pharasaic ritualism," its 
polemic object was, in fact, always Roman Catholicism. It was 
Catholicism that could be described as having "Rytes superstycyouse" 
(1538), "a vayne supersticious ceremoniall Masse" (1545), 
"superstitiousness of Beades" (1548), "papistical superstitions" (1547); the 
host was an example of "supersticious worshippying" (1561), of 
"paganick rites and foolish observances" (1573). (100) 
In Europe, and subsequently in Western civilization, the Reformation drastically altered 
ritual, calling it into question and subsequently denying its legitimacy. In summary, 
Smith points to "the earliest instance of the English use of the word reported by the 
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Oxford English Dictionary, 'contayning no manner of Doctrine ... but onely certayn 
ritual Decrees to no purpose' (1570)" (102). One of the primary complaints of many 
reformers was that individual Christians should be granted a direct and personal 
relationship with God, and that the sacerdotal nature of Catholic rituals interfered with 
such a relationship while simultaneously supporting otherwise indefensible authoritarian 
hierarchies. Ritual was thus declared empty, and Protestants since the sixteenth century 
have continued to speak of ritual in pejorative terms. 
Counter-reformers such as St. Ignatius responded to ritual's demise by developing 
the art of meditation: ritual was internalized, and by following the proper steps 
individuals could communicate directly with God. Smith justifies the end of his study of 
ritual in the following way: 
Our consideration of [...] ritual must end [...] in a distant land, in Paris, in 
1535. For there, [...] Ignatius of Loyola completed his classic manual of 
devotion. The Spiritual Exercises. There, as the first set of exercises for 
the third week of retreat, he commends, for the contemplation at midnight, 
meditation on the events of the Passion of Christ spread out over seven 
days. In each of these, the individual is asked, first, to "call to mind the 
narrative of the event," and, second, to make a "mental representation of 
the place." Here, all has been transferred to inner space. (117) 
In The Poetry of Meditation, Louis Martz argues that St. Ignatius of Loyola's 
meditative exercises, outlined in The Spiritual Exercises and approved by the Pope 
during the Counter-Reformation, "flourished on the Continent during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries" (4). At that time a great number of English Protestants were eager 
to regain some of the formal structure of worship that had been jettisoned as a result of 
the Reformation. Consequently, Catholics as well as Protestants (both Anglican and 
Puritan) eagerly adopted the highly structured meditative practices which, by the 
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beginning of the seventeenth century, were appearing "by the scores and by the 
hundreds" (Martz 5): "continental works of meditation poured into England, through 
English translations and adaptations [...]. Such an eager reception of the works of 
continental Catholicism suggests the satisfaction of a deep inner need" (Martz 7). This 
deep inner need involved a desire for devotional commimication with God, which was 
both initiated and consummated through meditative exercises. 
As a result of their power and popularity, Martz contends, these meditative 
exercises deeply influenced "the flourishing of English religious poetry in the 
seventeenth century" (1). According to Martz, Loyola's meditative practices were 
essential to the poetic development of John Donne, George Herbert, Henry Vaughan, and 
Richard Crashaw. Martz's study is devoted primarily to an extensive analysis of the 
parallels he finds between the structure of widespread meditative practices and the 
structure of major religious poetry written in seventeenth-century England. However, 
Martz is quick to point out that "a study of this art of meditation bears a strong relation to 
the poetry of our own day, so greatly influenced by two poets whose work bears the 
unmistakable imprint of the same Jesuit methods of meditation: Donne and Hopkins" 
(4). 
By suggesting that there is a "deep affinity between the seventeenth and the 
twentieth centuries," Martz hopes to show that the art of meditation, once it was adopted 
as an underlying principle of English poetry in the seventeenth century, continued to 
influence a broad range of poets through the twentieth century. After outlining the 
detailed structure of seventeenth-century Jesuit meditation, Martz goes on to speak more 
broadly of "Meditation as Poetic Discipline": 
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Meditation was a discipline directed toward creating the "act of pure 
attention" which D. H. Lawrence saw as essential to all significant 
discovery or decision: "you choose that object to concentrate upon which 
will best focus your consciousness." It was a discipline directed toward 
creating the kind of concentration which Wallace Stevens has described in 
a passage of his "Credences of Summer": 
Three times the concentrated self takes hold, three times 
The thrice concentrated self, having possessed 
The object, grips it in savage scrutiny, 
Once to make captive, once to subjugate 
Or yield to subjugation, once to proclaim 
The meaning of the capture, this hard prize. 
Fully made, fully apparent, fully found. (68) 
Since Jesuit meditative exercises were intended to personalize and internalize Catholic 
forms of worship that previously had been ritualistic and sacerdotal, it follows that the 
highly structured meditative practices should bear a close resemblance to ritual as it is 
broadly defined by Smith. It comes as no siuprise then that Martz's definition of 
meditation as "a discipline directed toward creating the 'act of pure attention,'" which he 
compares to Stevens' "concentration" (68), bears a striking resemblance to Smith's 
definition of ritual as "first and foremost, a mode of paying attention" (104). 
Martz outlines three phases of meditative exercise. He describes "the first 
prelude" of Jesuit meditation as 
the famous "composition of place, seeing the spof—a practice of 
enormous importance for religious poetry. For here, says St. Ignatius, "in 
contemplation or meditation on visible matters, such as the contemplation 
of Christ our Lord, Who is visible, the composition will be to see with the 
eyes of the imagination the corporeal place where the thing I wish to 
contemplate is found." (27) 
Everything that follows this first prelude relies for its effectiveness on the imaginative 
construction of a place in which subsequent mental activity takes on special significance. 
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This emphasis on place finds a direct parallel in Smith's account of ritual as "the creation 
of a controlled environment" (109) where "the ordinary [...] becomes significant [...] 
simply by being there" (104). 
As these resemblances suggest, meditation is, in a broad sense, the internalization 
of ritual; it is a process through which the individual, using the imagination, creates and 
subsequently gains access to a ritual environment without relying on a geographically 
situated, site-oriented structure such as a temple. In Natural Supernaturalism, Abrams 
argues that the development of Christian thought includes a long history of internalization 
through which "the theatre of [Biblical] events" is transferred "from the outer earth and 
heaven to the spirit of the single believer" (47).^ This aspect of Christian history suggests 
that the internalization of ritual practice through meditation was not an anomaly; 
Christians had long been accustomed to viewing all divinely-sponsored external events as 
having an analogical coimterpart in the inner life of the individual. 
Martz explains that after the composition of place has been accomplished, "there 
follows in the Jesuit exercises yet another prelude, of the utmost importance for the 
construction and outcome of the total exercise. For here the meditator asks of God 'that 
which I wish and desire' to achieve in the whole exercise" (32-33). Martz suggests that 
when this second phase of meditation is introduced into English poetry, it tends to 
involve "elaborately argued paradox" (41). The seeming contradiction of paradox 
mirrors the insurmountable incongruency that Smith locates in ritual. Smith argues that 
"Ritual is a means of performing the way things ought to be in conscious tension with the 
way things are," and that, because ritual is comprised of "ritual action rather than 
^ For a full discussion of Christian internalization, see Abrams' Natural Supernaturalism, pp. 46-56. 
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everyday action, ritual demonstrates that we know 'what is the case'" (110, emphasis 
mine). The accidental space outside the ritual environment—^the disruptive force of the 
natural world that threatens to undo ritual's imposed order—^is brought into the ritual 
environment via the consciousness of the participants. Within the closed system of ritual 
everything has meaning and nothing can disrupt the system; but consciousness of the 
unordered, accidental space outside the ritual environment is not annihilated, and ritual's 
participants subsequently gain a heightened consciousness of the insurmountable tension 
between the extraordinary otherness of the ritual environment—a direct reflection of 
God's grandeur—and the ordinariness outside that ritual environment. By engendering 
this heightened consciousness, ritual both clarifies and intensifies the incongruency 
between "there," where the substances or words or actions in question are profane, and 
"here," where those same substances or words or actions become sacred. Notions of 
sacredness, then, as maps or labels or indices of difference, indicate a renewed 
knowledge of the sponsoring deity's supreme otherness. 
Likewise, in the second prelude of Jesuit meditation, the practitioner willfully 
brings to mind the inevitable forces of sin and death that threaten to disrupt meditation 
itself As an example, Martz cites these "graphic directions" fi-om St. Ignatius: 
When I awake, not admitting other thoughts, immediately to turn my mind 
to that which I am going to contemplate in the first Exercise at midnight, 
bringing myself to confusion for my many sins, proposing examples to 
myself, as if a knight were to stand before his king and his court, covered 
with shame and confusion, because he had grievously offended him, from 
whom he had first received many gifts and favovirs. And thus too in the 
second Exercise, considering myself as a great sinner, and in chains, 
imagining, namely, that bound in fetters I am about to appear before the 
Supreme, Eternal Judge, taking as an example from how prisoners bound 
in chains, and deserving of death, appear before their temporal judge. (33) 
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As this example clearly demonstrates, the seventeenth century practice of meditation, like 
ritual, clarifies and intensifies incongruency. The simultaneous existence of, and 
insurmountable difference between, the fallen and sanctified states of the practitioner is 
brought to mind by imagining confusion, sin, shame, offensiveness, chains, and death as 
elements of the process that is intended to overcome these spiritual deficiencies. While 
these signs of disorder encompass the very forces that threaten to disrupt successful 
meditation, they demonstrate that the meditator is aware of the way things are. Without 
this awareness, the desire for what "ought to be" and the efficacy of God's power and 
grace in achieving it become unnecessary and meaningless. Stevens, as a secular 
meditative poet, replaces sacredness with nobility; but what he sought to achieve through 
his poetry is closely linked to the heightened consciousness engendered by ritual and 
meditation: Bloom suggests that though "nobility" is "hardly a word that now moves 
us," nobility "in its root means to be knowing or seeing" (Introduction 9). In other 
words, Stevens uses the concept of nobility to connote a state of heightened knowing or 
seeing that is rooted in traditional religious practices. 
Before proceeding with this line of inquiry, there is an essential distinction that 
must be made between meditation and ritual: in meditation, ritual's "there" and "here" 
are not experienced as actual, external, physical locations to be traversed, and therefore 
must be constructed internally by an individual imagination, or within a single poem. In 
other words, meditation intemaUzes the boundary that delineates ritual space, which 
appears as the "vital boimdary" in Stevens' "Final Soliloquy" (CP 524). In order to 
engender a heightened consciousness of incongruency—^the structural foundation of 
ritual's religious, sacerdotal process of sacration as well as Stevens' secularized, poetic 
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process of sanctioning—Stevens' poems must engender both the imagination's order and 
reality's potential destructiveness: paradoxically, "the absence of the imagination has / 
Itself to be imagined" (CP 503). 
Martz explains that once the first two primary meditative steps have been 
accomplished—once place has been imaginatively composed and incongruency has been 
clarified and intensified—"the climax, the aim and the end, of the whole exercise [of 
meditation] is achieved when the soul [...] is lifted up to speak with God in colloquy and 
to hear God speak to man in turn": "It is no surprise," Martz argues, 
to find the Jesuit Puente describing the ultimate goal of meditation in 
terms of poetical kinds, adapting the passage of Ephesians (5.18-20) which 
[seventeenth century English poets] constantly used to justify the writing 
of religious poetry: "Be filled with the spirit; speaking to yowselves in 
psalms and hymns and spiritual songs, singing and making melody in your 
heart to the Lord; giving thanks always for all things unto God and the 
Father in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ." (69-70) 
Stevens could not sing and make melodies in his heart to a Lord in whom he did not 
believe; but he did sing and make melodies in his heart to the earth: "the great poems of 
heaven and hell have been written and the great poem of the earth remains to be written" 
(NA 142). Stevens' song of praise to the earth emerges forcefully in "Sunday Morning" 
where, after a six-canto meditation on nature's divinity, fraught as these cantos are by the 
constant threat of Christianity's silencing staleness, Stevens finally lifts up his voice: 
Supple and turbulent, a ring of men 
Shall chant in orgy on a summer mom 
Their boisterous devotion to the sun. 
Not as a god, but as a god might be. 
Naked among them, like a savage source. 
Their chant shall be a chant of paradise. 
Out of their blood, returning to the sky. (CP 70) 
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Romantics such as Wordsworth and Coleridge jettisoned the orthodox Christian 
beliefs that guided earlier meditative poets, but they continued to write meditative verse, 
complete with the composition of place, the dialectical movement between desire and the 
forces that threaten to foil desire's fulfillment, and the culminating colloquy which, in the 
absence of an orthodox deity, is usually represented in Romantic poetry by a 
consummating marriage between the poet's voice and the earth's divinity. The 
importance assigned to the imagination in the meditative process exerted such a strong 
influence on the Romantic poets that it came to be one of the defining characteristics of 
the Romantic movement. According to Martz, meditation "was a discipline devoted to 
developing exactly the state of mind which Coleridge described in that famous account of 
the Imagination which has become the foundation of modem literary criticism," and 
which, "in all its details, becomes a perfect definition of the soul in successfiil 
meditation" (68). The emphasis that the Romantics placed on the imagination leads 
Martz to suggest that the tradition of religious meditation, understood as an imaginative 
process of the mind, should include poets who are not concerned with orthodox reUgion: 
The term "meditation" designates a process of the mind, rather than a 
particular subject-matter; a full definition of the meditative poem, it 
seems, should be broad enough to include certain poems that are not 
concerned with the religious or supernatural, in our usual sense of those 
words. The geru-e of meditative poetry should be broad enough to include 
some of [...] the later poetry of Wallace Stevens, as well as the 
unorthodox, though still religious, poetry of a Yeats or a Wordsworth. It 
must include "The poem of the mind in the act of finding / What will 
suffice." (324) 
In becoming a meditative poet who characterized the poem as an "act of the 
mind," Stevens was deeply influenced by Coleridge's theory of the imagination. Legget 
has shown that Stevens' oft-cited notion of the "mind in the act of finding / What will 
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suffice" (CP 239), with its psychological overtones, developed into the idea that "It Must 
Be Abstract" in "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction," a development engendered by 
Stevens' close reading of LA. Richard's Coleridge on Imagination. After closely 
studying Stevens' personal library, Legget concludes that "There can be no question as to 
the care with which Stevens followed Richards's argument" (27). According to Legget, 
Richards achieves a "rather creative reconstruction" of Coleridge's primary ideas 
concerning the imagination, 
redefining both mind and nature in such a way as to violate neither 
Coleridge's intent nor a contemporary materialist's more skeptical 
epistemology. [...] What must have interested Stevens most in his close 
reading of the work was that, in the process of adjusting romantic theory to 
contemporary thought, Richards claims to have solved the epistemological 
dilemma that had provided Stevens with one of his principal poetic 
themes, that is, the opposition of two seeming irreconcilable views of the 
relation between mind and world. (28-29) 
These two seeming irreconcilable views are described by Richards as "a 
projective outlook, which treats imagination's products as figment, and a realist outlook, 
which takes the imagination to be a means of apprehending reality," two views that 
correspond to Stevens' notion of the "imagination-reality complex" (Legget 29). Legget 
explains Richards' conclusion as follows: 
In order to escape contradiction [in the projective/realist dilemma], one 
must avoid "the transformations that inevitably occur in deriving the 
doctrines fi-om the 'facts of mind.'" Since any prose description will seem 
to choose one doctrine over the other, it "is better to say, with Coleridge, 
that our concern is with the fact of mind itself, the immediate self-
consciousness in the imaginative moment which is the source of the 
doctrines." (31) 
According to Richards, the choice between a projective view of the imagination and a 
realist view of the imagination is a false choice forced upon us by the failings of language 
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when we attempt to prosaically theorize the "fact of mind" in purely epistemological 
terms. It is important to note, however, that Smith characterizes ritual in such a way that 
it can be viewed as an epistemological process sanctioned by religious belief: "There is a 
'gnostic' dimension to ritual. It provides the means for demonstrating that we know what 
ought to have been done, what ought to have taken place. Nonetheless, by the very fact 
that it is ritual action rather than everyday action, ritual demonstrates that we know 'what 
is the case'" (110, emphasis mine). 
For a poet like Stevens who was intent on creating a valid substitute for religion 
through secularized meditation, Richards' description of Coleridge's "fact of mind" can 
be understood as an internalized and abstracted ritual act through which the imagination 
simultaneously produces figments and provides a means of apprehending reality without 
giving over, finally, to one or the other. The imagination expresses the poet's "Blessed 
rage for order" (CP 130) while rhetorically drawing attention to itself as an ordering force 
and thus distinguishing itself from "the wind that lashes everything at once" (CP 358). 
On the one hand, the poem demonstrates a knowledge of what ought to be. As the poetic 
fiction successfially engenders this knowledge, it also engenders belief; "one's final 
belief must be in a fiction" (L 370). In "Not Ideas About the Thing but the Thing Itself," 
the finale of Stevens' Collected Poems, this belief makes it possible for the "scrawny 
cry" of nature's reality to be regarded as "A chorister whose c preceded the choir" (CP 
534), and thus for reality itself to be ennobled: 
It was part of the colossal sun, 
Surrounded by its choral rings. 
Still far away. It was like 
A new knowledge of reality. (CP 534) 
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On the other hand, by the very fact that this is a poetic act rather than an everyday act, the 
poem demonstrates a knowledge of 'what is the case': the "scrawny cry" comes "from 
outside"; "It would have been outside"; "The sun was coming from outside" (CP 534). 
The simultaneity of this dual knowledge was once engendered by ritual; through his close 
reading of Richards, Stevens was able to adopt Coleridge's theory of the meditative 
imagination, and thus to secularize the ritual act by transferring it to the realm of the 
mind. 
Stevens was also deeply influenced by Wordsworth's poetry and his 
conceptualization of the Romantic project. According to Abrams, Wordsworth's belief 
that the "main region of his song" should be "'the Mind of Man'" (55) was an idea that 
profoundly influenced Stevens' resolution to write "The poem of the mind in the act of 
finding / What will suffice" (CP 239). Wordsworth conceived of himself as the 
visionary poet who would fulfill Milton's prediction that once paradise is restored, "the 
earth 'shall all be Paradise'" (Abrams 26). In order to make "such realms [...] available 
on this earth, [...] we need only to unite our minds to the outer universe in a holy 
marriage, a passionate love-match, and paradise is ours": 
That Wordsworth commits himself deliberately to this figure of a 
culminating and procreative marriage between mind and nature he makes 
unmistakable by expanding upon it with pomp and circumstance. "I, long 
before the blissful hour arrives, / Would chant, in lonely peace, the spousal 
verse / Of this great consummation." The plot envisioned by the aid of the 
"prophetic Spirit," then, will end in the marriage of the protagonists, and 
Wordsworth's song is to be the "spousal verse," or sustained 
prothalamion, of its anticipated "consummation." This song will be an 
evangel to effect a spiritual resurrection among mankind—it will "arouse 
the sensual from their sleep / Of death." (Abrams 27) 
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Abrams goes on to summarize Wordsworth's primary poetic project in terms of his 
visionary stance: "The vision is that of the awesome depths and height of the human 
mind, and the power of that mind as in itself adequate, by consummating a holy marriage 
with the external universe, to create out of the world of all of us, in a quotidian and 
recurrent miracle, a new world which is the equivalent of paradise" (28). 
Stevens was too evasive and skeptical to see himself as a prophet, and he was too 
disjunctive a poet to create the kind of narrative, autobiographical myth that is 
characteristic of Wordsworth's longer poems: "Among modem poets none stays so close 
to some of Wordsworth's formulations as Stevens does, so that his departures from his 
predecessor stand out with special prominence. [...] Stevens deliberately rejected both 
the prophetic stance and the epic voice" (Abrams 69). In a statement to similar affect. 
Bloom suggests that Stevens maintained something of an "antimythological bias" 
(Introduction 4).® This is not to suggest that Stevens avoided a mythological or prophetic 
stance altogether; Stevens simply did not embrace the audacity of Wordsworth's 
visionary hope. For example, at the end of "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction," Stevens' 
most ambitious effort to formulate a poetic mythology, Stevens qualifies his prophetic 
hope for revolution; the final prediction of future transformation is introduced with a 
tone that is more reservedly wry than confidently apocalyptic: "They will get it straight 
one day at the Sorbonne" (CP 407). Stevens seems to have recognized that getting it 
straight one day would necessarily be a momentary achievement, because myth must 
inevitably change to provide revitalized sanctions for being. The necessity that remains 
® For a full discussion see Chapter 4, Harmonium: Crisis and the Comedian, in Bloom's Wallace Stevens: 
The Poems of Our Climate. Bloom argues that in the final section of the poem, Stevens largely fails to 
bring his myth to fruition, and consequently "It is the poetic future that is projected and so cast away" (82). 
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constant for Stevens is not the myth itself, but the heightened consciousness of 
incongruency provided by a ritual structure, which must repeatedly be performed by an 
act of the mind. This heightened consciousness of incongruency is succinctly captured in 
the section of "Notes" entitled "It Must Change," where Stevens provides an apt 
elaboration of relative difference that results in a rapturous sense of freshness: 
Two things of opposite natures seem to depend 
On one another, as a man depends 
On a woman, day on night, the imagined 
On the real. This is the origin of change. 
Winter and spring, cold copulars, embrace 
And forth the particulars of rapture come. (CP 392) 
The allusion to a rapturous embrace in these lines provides further proof Stevens 
was, like Wordsworth, intent upon consummating a holy marriage with the external 
universe in a quotidian and recurrent miracle, which is a perfect description of the 
secularized ritual process in Stevens' poetry. The Wordsworthian formulation Stevens 
most frequently uses to depict such a marriage is the moment of heightened or visionary 
consciousness. Abrams argues that "Wordsworth is preeminently a poet of the revelatory 
and luminous Moment. [...] In the completed [Prelude] of 1805 the overall plot of mental 
growth moves in leaps of discovery, at encounters when a natural or human object 
unexpectedly shows forth a meaning beyond propositional statement" (390). When a 
poem's development depends on the creation of a poetic structure in which such 
"encoimters" can be created or discovered, ritual's significance becomes more apparent: 
"Ritual represents the creation of a controlled environment where the variables (the 
accidents) of ordinary life may be displaced precisely because they are felt to be so 
overwhelmingly present and powerful" (Smith 109). In Stevensian terms, such moments 
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occur when a natural or human object is sanctioned and a revitalized sense of nobility is 
affirmed. 
Morris provides an apt summary of the meditative mind in Stevens' poetry: "the 
image of the mind is the meeting place of imagination and reality: there, in a process of 
thought figured by poetry, imagination's conceivings become the mate of reality's 
productions. The moment of highest poetry, the moment in which reality and 
imagination balance, is for Stevens the moment of grace" (165). Pack reaches a similar 
conclusion as he explores Stevens' attempt in "The Auroras of Autumn" to "hold the idea 
of creation and the idea of nothingness simultaneously in his mind, trying to unite the 
concept of presence and the concept of vanishing" (98): 
Within the limits of physical reality, there are, nevertheless, infinite human 
possibilities for creating structures of meaning. The 'whole' that Stevens 
seeks to contrive includes the innocence of physical reality and the human 
need to create a sense of the holy that is not, however, dependent on an 
authorizing divinity. [...] The physical conditions of the world constitute 
the awesome, indifferent, and inescapable reality that our imagination 
must contrive to humanize as we attempt to "choir it with the naked wind" 
(CP 415). (114) 
For Stevens, the efficacy of the imagination, like the efficacy of the ritual environment, 
does not rely solely on its ability to order nature's reality, but also on its ability to 
establish a vital boundary that acknowledges nature's otherness, and thus to heighten the 
tension that exists between human desire and nature's indifference. In "The Irrational 
Element in Poetry," Stevens contends that "One is always writing about two things at the 
same time in poetry and it is this that produces the tension characteristic of poetry" (OP 
227). Stevens' secular term for what results from this tension is "nobility"; tellingly, 
however, Morris refers to these moments of heightened tension in Stevens' poetry as 
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moments of "grace," and Pack contends that for Stevens such moments engender "a sense 
of the holy." Such characterizations again suggest that nobility is for Stevens a secular, 
post-Christian rearticulation of the religious content of poetry, and that poetry's sanctions 
must be realized in a poetic environment whose function parallels that of a ritual 
environment. 
The disappearance of the gods is reflected in the ruination and failed efficacy of 
their temples—"the strength of the church grows less and less until the church stands for 
little more than propriety" (L 348)—and yet for Stevens the function of those temples in 
the life of humanity remains necessary. In "Of Modem Poetry," Stevens' secularized 
temple is figured as a theatre, and the priest is figured as an "actor" who plays the role of 
"A metaphysician in the dark" (CP 240). When temples were physical structures 
sanctioned by gods, "the scene was set; [the mind] repeated what / Was in the script" 
(CP 239). With the disappearance of the gods, however, 
[...] the theatre was changed 
To something else. Its past was a souvenir. 
It has to be living, to leam the speech of the place. 
It has to face the men of the time and to meet 
The women of the time. It has to think about war 
And it has to find what will suffice. It has 
To construct a new stage. It has to be on that stage 
And, like an insatiable actor, slowly and 
With meditation, speak words that in the ear [...] (CP 239-40) 
Stevens turns repeatedly—one might say ritualistically—^to the same latitudinal regions in 
his poems, set as so many of them are in either the cold bareness of the north or the exotic 
fiillness of the south; but for every successful poetic act that results in the heightened 
consciousness of a revitalized poetic vision, a new poetic theatre must be constructed 
62 
through an imaginative "act of finding" so that words can be spoken with original 
fi-eshness. In "Of Modem Poetry," this process is finally described as the "finding of a 
satisfaction" (CP 240). For Stevens, satisfaction is attained during moments of fresh 
vision, or new seeing, which are also moments when nobility is realized and life is 
sanctioned; but Stevens admits elsewhere that "It can never be satisfied, the mind, never" 
(CP 247). Viewed from this perspective, Stevens' later and increasing insistence on flux 
as a vital element of his poetry does not arise solely from an empiricist's knowledge of 
entropy; it arises as well fi-om the abiding human need to rescue fi-om that knowledge a 
counter-force that is thoroughly secular while maintaining, in a broad sense, the 
possibility for the sanctioning of human life that was previously provided by religious 
ritual. The continual need for an imaginative revitalization of this counter-force is 
captured in "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven," where Stevens says, "Alpha 
continues to begin. / Omega is refreshed at every end" (CP 469). 
One way to understand the connection between seventeenth-century religious 
poetry and modem secular poetry is to consider the subject that most frequently propels 
the meditative imagination into poetic activity. As the Romantics developed their own 
meditative poetics, the contemplation of death, which for seventeenth century poets had 
been secondary to meditations on God and the mysteries of the Christian faith, became 
the primary meditative subject. For the Romantics, and subsequently for Stevens, 
mediations on death provided the catalyst for the spiritual crisis that Abrams cites as the 
defining characteristic of Romantic poetry. 
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In a chapter entitled "Self Knowledge: the Spiritual Combat," Martz argues that 
although "Self-examination is not, properly speaking, meditation in the sense that 
dominates [his] study," it is nevertheless "inseparably related to the art of meditation" 
(118). For seventeenth-century religious poets, "the most widely and intensely 
cultivated" means of self-knowledge was generated by "the meditation upon death": 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries proceeded to develop the 
meditation on death into a brilliantly imaginative exercise. The Jesuit 
"composition of place" and "application of the senses" brought their 
intensifying beams to bear upon the death-bed scenes and wormy 
circumstance which the medieval Ars Moriendi had simply envisioned. 
(Martz 135-136) 
Mediation on death, as a means of self-knowledge, has a long history in Western culture; 
it can be traced back at least as far as Socrates' meditation on his own imminent death in 
the Phaedo. Like Socrates, seventeenth-century religious poets tended to focus on "'two 
voiages' to be made [...], of which [the] voyage of the body to the grave is the less 
important. The other, toward which the major effort of the meditation should be directed, 
is to 'follow after the soul'" (Martz 139). For the Romantics and for Stevens, the non-
bodily voyage is achieved by following after the mind. The connection between self-
knowledge and death is captured in one of Wordsworth's early manuscripts of the 
Prospectus: 
Not chaos, not 
The darkest Pit of the profoundest hell 
Nor aught of [blinder] vacancy scoop'd out 
By help of dreams can breed such fear and awe 
As fall upon us often when we look 
Into our minds, into the mind of Man. (Abrams 449) 
One of the primary difficulties Stevens faced in the middle of his poetic career 
involved his belief in the mind of man, or the "essential imagination" (L 370). By 
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inheriting so many Romantic formulations, Stevens was prone to believe that the power 
of the mind is adequate in itself The danger inherent in such a belief is that the mind will 
grow rigidly satisfied with its own creations and become a vehicle for escapism. This 
danger appears in "The Poems of Our Climate" as "The evilly compounded, vital I" (CP 
193), and in "The Motive for Metaphor" as "The vital, arrogant, fatal, dominant X" (CP 
288). Stevens expands on the problem posed by essential imagination in "Asides on the 
Oboe," a poem composed in 1940, where he attempts to affirm the efficacy of the 
philosopher-poet as central man: 
If you say the hautboy man is not enough, 
Can never stand as god, is ever wrong 
In the end, however naked, tall, there is still 
The impossible possible philosopher's man. 
The man who has had the time to think enough. 
The central man, the human globe, responsive 
As a mirror with a voice, the man of glass. 
Who in a million diamonds sums us up. (CP 250) 
Stevens hedges his claim that the central man is enough in himself by referring to him 
paradoxically as an "impossible possible"; but he continues to elaborate his affirmation of 
the central man's self-sufficiency in the second canto of the poem, claiming that the poet 
"is the transparence of the place in which / He is" (CP 251). Though Stevens admits that 
the philosopher-poet can be "cold and numbered," he also has the poet cry out "'Thou art 
not August unless I make thee so'" (CP 251). In this poem, nature does not contain its 
own opaqueness. The reality of simimer's fecund heat presents an affront to the poet's 
generative imagination, so that the pun on "August" denies nature's inherent grandeur, 
reducing it to a transparent means by which the poet's power can be realized. Stevens 
goes on to say in the third and final canto of the poem that we gain self-knowledge—"the 
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sum of men," the "central evil, the central good"—"without external reference" (CP 251). 
Passages like these, which can be found throughout Stevens' middle period, are often 
cited by critics who read him as the Nietzschean artist-hero exercising his will-to-power 
through a valorization of the essential imagination. In 1942, however, Stevens makes a 
sarcastic reference to Nietzsche in answer to a critic who had written to ask about the 
poet as hero in Stevens' poetry; "My interest in the hero, major man, the giant, has 
nothing to do with the Biermensch; in fact, I throw knives at the hero" (L 409). That 
Stevens defensively overstates his case only proves the extent to which the difficulty of 
the essential imagination had plagued him. 
As Stevens' poetry evolved through the 1940's and into the 1950's, he came to 
see that the power of the mind is adequate to producing sanctions for life only when that 
which escapes the mind is invited into the poem and held in close proximity to that which 
is produced by the mind. In Peter Brazeau's Parts of a World: Wallace Stevens 
Remembered, the Reverend Arthur Hanley recalls a death-bed conversation during which 
Stevens professed a belief in the "absolute idea of God": "'Everything,'" Stevens 
purportedly said, "'has been created. There is only one uncreated'" (294). In Stevens' 
poetry, the one irreducible otherness that consistently escapes the mind's creative 
reductions cannot be an ontological God; since Stevens believed that the gods had 
disappeared into the abyss, nothingness itself comes to represent the force of an 
irreducible other. In terms of Stevens' naturalism, otherness also includes nature's 
entropic movement toward dissolution. Irreducible otherness thus appears in Stevens' 
poems through meditations that acknowledge the imknowable outer blank of the universe 
as well as the poet's inevitable death. 
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These figurations of otherness appear prominently in "Esthetique Du Mai," which 
appropriately begins with the meditative composition of place: Naples provides the 
imagined physical setting in which the poet can then enact a meditation on death. As the 
poem's unnamed character writes letters home from Naples, he listens to the "terror of 
the sound" of Vesuvius: "The volcano trembled in another ether, / as the body trembles 
at the end of life" (CP 314). A full reading of "Esthetique Du Mai" is not possible within 
the limits of this thesis, but the poem is important because it demonstrates one of 
Stevens' first attempts to fully develop an internalized ritual structure within a single 
poem. If meditation is to provide sanctions for life, it must, like ritual, provoke a 
heightened consciousness of the incongruency between desire for what ought to be and 
knowledge of what is. 
The terrifying sound of the volcano disrupts a solipsistic conception of what ought 
to be by "express[ing] / What meditation never quite achieved" (CP 314). What 
meditation had never quite achieved for Stevens was an adequate otherness. As an 
immense and unavoidable example of what is, the volcano appears as a geological reality 
which quite literally contains nature's imminent threat of death. Stevens expands upon 
his acknowledgment of a disquieting otherness in the second canto: 
The moon rose up as if it had escaped 
His meditation. It evaded his mind. 
It was part of a supremacy always 
Above him. The moon was always free from him. 
As night was firee from him. The shadows touched 
Or merely seemed to touch him as he spoke 
A kind of elegy he found in space. (CP 315) 
The moon represents the "cold [...] vacancy" that emerges "When the phantoms are gone 
and the shaken realist / First sees reality" (CP 320). By evading the power of the mind to 
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reduce it to a non-threatening order, this supreme otherness provides the grounds on 
which the poet can continue to compose his poem; the moon may be a cold vacancy, but 
the acknowledgement of that vacancy provides an occasion for elegy. While elegy may 
mark disappearance or negation, the very fact that it requires speech reinforces the 
promise of continued life. At the end of the eighth canto, Stevens explicitly affirms that 
he has faced a supreme otherness without being silenced by it: 
Again, in the imagination's new beginning. 
In the yes of the realist spoken because he must 
Say yes, spoken because under every no 
Lay a passion for yes that had never been broken. (CP 320) 
In the ninth canto, Stevens retraces his poem's development through the first eight 
cantos. The poet first experiences "Panic in the face of the moon" because the moon 
cannot be reduced to a transparency that reveals the power of the essential imagination; in 
fact, it cannot be reduced to "anything" at all, and "nothing is left but comic ugliness / Or 
a lustred nothingness" (CP 320). As Stevens brings the adjectives "comic" and "lustred" 
to bear on "ugliness" and "nothingness," however, he begins to create a heightened sense 
of incongruency, signaling that the poet's passion for "yes" is beginning to take form. By 
the end of the poem's thirteenth canto, panic has resolved into stoic acceptance as the 
meditation on death becomes "an adventure to be endured / With the politest 
helplessness. Ay-mi! / One feels its action moving in the blood" (CP 324). 
In the fourteenth canto, Stevens explicitly acknowledges that his former 
conception of poetry—the construction of "A promenade amid the grandeurs of the 
mind"—^had made him, like Konstantinov, 
the Ixmatic of one idea 
In a world of ideas, who would have all the people 
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Live, M^ork, suffer and die in that idea 
In a world of ideas. (CP 325) 
This argument is carried through to the beginning of the fifteenth canto, where Stevens 
contends that "The greatest poverty is not to live / In a physical world, to feel that one's 
desire / Is too difficult to tell from despair" (CP 325). Nothing in Stevens' poetry comes 
closer to demonstrating his discovery that the imagination must overcome solipsism by 
functioning like ritual space. The acknowledgement of an irreducible otherness through a 
meditation on death creates a moment of seemingly inescapable crisis: an inward 
movement implies escapism, but an outward movement threatens with a silence akin to 
death. The only available resolution depends on the elaboration of a vital boundary 
between the mind's imposed order and nature's incessant otherness; with the 
establishment of this boundary, creation and nothingness can be drawn together in the 
mind. The resulting poem makes the ambiguity between desire and despair precise, 
which leads to a transcendent and celebratory moment in which the ordinary gains 
nobility: 
The green com gleams and the metaphysicals 
Lie sprawling in majors of the August heat, 
The rotund emotions, paradise unknown. 
This is the thesis scrivened in delight, 
The reverberating psalm, the right chorale. (CP 326) 
Even as the fields and their seasonal fecundity are freshly envisioned, the presence of the 
"unknown" remains, and the resulting tension reverberates in song. 
"Esthetique Du Mai," like most Jesuit meditations and many meditative Romantic 
poems, adheres to the structure of internalized ritual by delineating a poetic space in 
which the variables of ordinary life are felt to be overwhelmingly present and powerful. 
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The primary elements that comprise this structure—^the subjective imagination's promise 
of generative creativity; the objective universe's threat of disintegration, chaos, and 
nothingness; and the consimmiating visionary moment—can be found throughout 
Stevens' Collected Poems. Beginning in the early 1940's, however, Stevens grew 
increasingly concerned that any limited version of this structure—any poem that did not 
include each of these elements and make his readers "feel the obscurity of an order, a 
whole, / A knowledge, that which arranged the rendezvous" (CP 524)—^would indicate 
that he, like Ludwig Richter in "Chaos in Motion and Not in Motion," had "lost the 
whole in which he was contained" (CP 358). 
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3. 
"THOSE SANCTIONS THAT ARE THE REASON FOR HIS BEESfG" 
In "Metaphor as Degeneration," published in The Auroras of Autumn, Stevens 
attempts to provide a poetic sanction for being by making incongruency beautifully 
precise. The catalyst for this sanctioning act is a meditation on death: 
If there is a man white as marble 
Sits in a wood, in the greenest part. 
Brooding sounds of the images of death, 
So there is a man in black space 
Sits in nothing that we know, 
Brooding sounds of river noises; 
And these images, these reverberations. 
And others, make certain how being 
Includes death and the imagination. (CP 444) 
"Brooding" suggests the sustained mental attention that characterizes meditation, but it 
also suggests the incubation of eggs, so that the "river noises" of the second stanza are 
paradoxically hatched from "black space," which is noiseless. Pack provides a helpful 
explanation of this paradox as he explicates a similar paradox in "The Auroras of 
Autumn": "Although the opposite of creation may be thought of as destruction, as in the 
relationship between order and entropy, it is equally meaningful to conceive of 
nothingness as the dialectical antithesis of creation in that it can be the womb of creation, 
the realization of the possible" (98). Pack goes on to suggest that when Stevens is able 
"to hold the idea of creation and the idea of nothingness simultaneously in his mind," the 
result is "Poetic creation" (98). 
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In "Metaphor as Degeneration," the dialectical relationship between imagination's 
desire and death's nothingness results in the poetic creation of the river, which becomes 
the primary metaphor of the poem. As in ritual, however, the dialectical arrangement 
does not resolve into a singular synthesis; even if the two figures trade places, "The 
marble man remains himself in space. / The man in the black wood descends imchanged" 
(CP 444). Although the two poles of the dialectical arrangement may be held in the 
single consciousness of the poet, and the poem itself can be viewed as the synthesis that 
results from the dialectical relationship—just as ritual can provide the singular space in 
which the awareness of both order and order's undoing can be held and heightened in the 
mind of ritual observers—^the incongruency cannot ultimately vanish into perfect unity; it 
must somehow be reflected in the poem, or the heightened consciousness of 
insurmountable difference will not be maintained. 
The river that is created from this dialectical arrangement "Is not Swatara" (CP 
444), which is an actual stream in Permsylvania near the region where Stevens was bom; 
rather, it is a metaphorical river, or the river of meaningful soimd that emerges from the 
poet's meditation on death. However, the presence of the Swatara suggests that metaphor 
is not bom in empty space alone, but also, like the poet, in a specific earthly location. 
The birth of metaphor, then, relies on an earthly man, presumably from Pennsylvania, 
who sits in the "greenest part" of a "wood," which is usually the low lying area next to a 
body of water such as a river, and meditates on death; this meditation leads to the 
imaginative figure of another man, who, though he sits in the unknowable blackness of 
space, paradoxically meditates on the life-sounds of earth. The poem itself hatches from 
the tension between these realms—^the green realm of the earth and the black realm of 
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space—which interact like "Two parallels that meet if only in / The meeting of their 
shadows" (CP 407). The heightened consciousness of incongruency provided by this 
meeting gives birth to nobility in that it results in the sanctioning of being; in the sixth 
tercet of the poem, Stevens says that the poem's river—its flow of poetically meaningful 
sounds—"is being" (CP 444). 
Stevens then wonders how this can be, how metaphor, as the living offspring of 
the imagination, can also contain the entropy associated with death and empty space: 
"How, then, is metaphor degeneration, / When Swatara becomes this undulant river / And 
the river becomes the landless, waterless ocean?" (CP 444). The answer comes in the 
poem's final tercet, which suggests that it is not a matter of the one becoming the other. 
The Swatara does not simply evaporate into the waterlessness and soundlessness of 
space, just as the nothingness of black space does not simply take on the life of the river; 
instead, the "river noises" named in the second stanza are poetically enacted as a river of 
heightened lyricism: "Here the black violets grow down to its banks / And the memorial 
mosses hang their green / Upon it, as it flows ahead" (CP 445). Even within this lyrical 
arrangement, however, the pitch of the poem's incongruency is heightened without being 
overcome, as the imagination holds "greenest" earth against "black space." "Here," 
meaning here in this final stanza of the poem, the "black" of empty space, as an adjective, 
modifies "violets," which are not only spring flowers that suggest earthly florabundance, 
but also flowers that exhibit the color in cosmological spectroscopy toward which the 
light of a space-object shifts if it is drawing closer to the earth. Similarly, the word 
"memorial," with its elegiac connotation of death, modifies the "mosses" that tint the life-
giving water of the river "green," drawing images of death and life into such close 
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proximity that they appear to touch. Additionally, the sharp final consonants of "black," 
"violet," and "bank" in the first line of the stanza reverberate in their close proximity to 
the softer consonants of "memorial," "mosses," and "green" in the second line of the 
stanza. If poetic metaphor is to sanction being's nobility, it must include the harsh reality 
of degeneration even as it creates life-giving sanctions. In this poem, the blackness of 
empty space, with its suggestion of death's nothingness, is placed in the imagination of 
the meditative man from Pennsylvania, where it is drawn ever closer to the violets, the 
mosses, and the river noises of the actual green wood in which the man sits. As in ritual, 
the reader is invited to think deeply about the one "now" in terms of the other as the 
resulting reverberations become the metaphoric river-song of the poem, which in turn 
provides "those sanctions that are the reason for [...] being" (NA 35). 
"The Rock" is an extraordinarily moving elegy, and its power arises in part from 
its sfrangeness. Unlike "To An Old Philosopher in Rome," another late elegy Stevens 
wrote for his longtime friend and mentor, George Santayana, "The Rock" is 
simultaneously an elegy for Stevens' own life, for his own poetic fictions, and for time's 
incessant negations. The first section of the poem, "Seventy Years Later," begins with 
the despairing assertion that memory, whether personal or poetic, has been negated or 
rendered meaningless by the passage of time. Stevens was seventy as he wrote the poem, 
and a consciousness of death implicitly propels the opening stanzas: 
It is an illusion that we were ever alive. 
Lived in the houses of mothers, arranged ourselves 
By our own motions in a freedom of air. 
Regard the freedom of seventy years ago. 
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It is no longer air. The houses still stand, 
Though they are rigid in rigid emptiness. (CP 525) 
The crisis in these lines is a crisis of belief. Stevens' allusion to "houses of mothers" 
evokes both the literal habitations of youth and the figurative habitations of poems, since 
"mothers" recalls Stevens' own religious mother as well as the third canto of "Aiu-oras of 
Autumn," where "The mother's face, / The purpose of the poem, fills the room" (CP 
413). Stevens' poems, like the houses he has inhabited, still stand; but they appear to 
have been emptied of their purpose, which means that they no longer provide sanctions 
for life. "Illusions" is a pejorative word at this point in the poem, indicating the illusions 
of stale, orthodox fictions, which are the opposite of living, ennobling fictions. The 
"freedom of air" is the freedom to breathe revitalized meaning into the words of a poem; 
but the poems of the distant past have long been breathed into existence and now stand 
rigidly on the page. Stevens is aware that after his last breath, new arrangements of 
words will no longer be possible, and he must confront the possibilit>' that his sanctions 
for life, like those previously provided by religion, will become static and be emptied of 
their power. 
As the negations continue, the lines register subtle shifts in tone: 
Even our shadows, their shadows, no longer remain. 
The lives these lived in the mind are at an end. 
They never were ... The sounds of the guitar 
Were not and are not. Absurd. The words spoken 
Were not and are not. It is not to be believed. (CP 525) 
The sense of despair is heightened with the word "Even," and the shadows that no longer 
remain are the shadows in the epilogue of "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction," where 
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Stevens instructs the soldier to gladly accept his death, because in the "war between the 
mind / And sky," 
The two are one. 
They are a plural, a right and left, a pair, 
Two parallels that meet if only in 
The meeting of their shadows. (CP 407) 
In this passage, death's nothingness—represented by the emptiness of the sky—^must be 
accepted as one of the essential parallels if we are to live "on the bread of faithfiil 
speech," which is the same as believing in "the poet's lines" (CP 408); Stevens seems to 
admit in "The Rock," however, that his own advice has become nearly impossible to 
follow once death threatens to silence his own poetic speech. "They never were" and the 
repetition of "Were not and are not" tonally evoke a dreary sense of despairing 
resignation; but with the quiet assertion of "Absurd," the tone shifts to bitterness and 
then, with "It is," to something that hints ever so slightly at defiance, as if a willfulness is 
begirming to sprout from hopelessness. 
The poem's cadence begins to reverberate as Stevens commences to trope on his 
own negations; the lines stretch out with accumulating vigor before shrinking down again 
with renewed intensity; 
The meetings at noon at the edge of the field seems like 
An invention, an embrace between one desperate clod 
And another in a fantastic consciousness, 
In a queer assertion of humanity: 
A theorem proposed between the two— (CP 525) 
The meeting in these lines is the rendezvous between Stevens and his interior paramour. 
Though "desperate clod" continues to convey a sense of despairing loss, and "theorem" 
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suggests the stasis of a formulaic truth, "invention," "embrace," "fantastic 
consciousness," and "queer assertion" signal the first major shift in the poem, a shift that 
culminates in the dash following "two—": 
Two figures in a nature of the sim. 
In the sun's design of its own happiness. 
As if nothingness contained a metier, 
A vital assumption, an impermanence 
In its permanent cold, an illusion so desired 
That the green leaves came and covered the high rock. 
That the lilacs came and bloomed, like a blindness cleaned. 
Exclaiming bright sight, as it was satisfied. 
In a birth of sight. The blooming and the musk 
Were being alive, an incessant being alive, 
A particular of being, that gross universe. (CP 525-26) 
Again, Pack's assertion that nothingness "can be the womb of creation, the realization of 
the possible," provides a helpful gloss on the incredible return of vitality in these lines 
(98). I have been unable to locate another poem in Stevens' oeuvre that moves so rapidly 
or so forcefully from an apocalypse of faith to the rebirth of belief As the sun breaks 
into the poem, it brings its hopeful vitality along, allowing Stevens' hope in a continued 
poetic vocation to re-emerge fi-om nothingness. 
This re-emergence is qualified by "As if," which implies that the return of belief 
might merely be an assumption; but the assumption contains its own vitality as it leads 
Stevens out of a permanent apocalypse and back to desire. Once again, the final no is 
implicitly followed by a yes, and Stevens begins to re-assert a belief in poetic creations as 
desire confronts despair. The green leaves represent the retum of life, but also the return 
of the sanctions for life provided by poetry: the allusion to Whitman's famous elegy for 
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Lincoln and the word "Exclaiming" both indicate that the leaves, in addition to being 
actual leaves of the earth, are also the pages of Stevens' poems. These leaves have 
accumulated to such an extent that they came to cover the rock, which is not surprising in 
light of the fact that the rock appears more than forty times in Stevens' Collected Poems. 
As Morris suggests, in the Christian tradition "the rock represents the revealed truth of 
Christ promised by the church" (139), so that in this poem the stage is set for the 
cleansing of blindness; this allusion to one of Christ's miracles also evokes the poem's 
first allusion to poetry as secular cure, and the resulting "birth of sight" represents an 
emerging potential for the renewed vision provided by nobility. After "bloomed" and 
"blooming" call to mind a return of life, "Being" is repeated three times in the final two 
lines of the first section, as if revitalized desire has led Stevens to willfully chant the life 
of his poems and their sanctions for being back into existence. At this point in the poem, 
however, the chant is not entirely successful; being is still described as "that gross 
universe," which suggests that being has become glaringly evident, but also that it 
remains unrefined: the particulars of this poem's sanctions for being have yet to emerge 
fi-om the incessant fecundity of the earth. 
The second section of the poem, entitled "The Poem as Icon," refines the 
emerging vision of being. Despair lingers in the first stanza: 
It is not enough to cover the rock with leaves. 
We must be cured of it by a cure of the ground 
Or a cure of ourselves, that is equal to a cure 
Of the ground, a cure beyond forgetfulness. (CP 526) 
Stevens first calls for a cure of reality and then for a cure of essential imagination (as 
long as it is equal to a cure of reality), because the poetic fictions that cover the rock are 
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prone, like the poet, to grow old and be forgotten. If a cure is to be beyond forgetfulness, 
it must be permanent, and the solid reality of the ground is the greatest permanence we 
know. "Cure" has many meanings, all of which gain significance in this passage. To 
cure can mean to deal with in a way that eliminates or rectifies; to free from something 
objectionable or harmful; to restore to health, soundness, or normality; and to prepare or 
alter especially by chemical or physical processing for keeping or use. What we must be 
cured of is not the rock itself, but the rock covered with the leaves of past poetic fictions. 
A healthy vision of the rock will be a fresh vision of the rock, which can occur only if 
rigid old figurations of the rock are re-imagined. Significantly, the poem contains a latent 
religious element that is never far from the surface; a cure is also a spiritual charge, or 
the care of a pastoral parish, suggesting that the process of elimination will allow for a 
restorative re-imagining, which will culminate in a new sense of nobility and a 
revitalization of the sanctions for being. 
The fifth line of the second stanza appears to test the possibility that the cure will 
come from neither the ground nor ourselves: 
And yet the leaves, if they broke into bud. 
If they broke into bloom, if they bore fruit. 
And if we ate the incipient colorings 
Of their fresh culls might be a cure of the groimd. (CP 526) 
The repetition of "broke" prevents the return to poetry-as-cure from being a simple return 
to past poetic fictions; if Stevens' past fictions are to bear fruit, they must break into new 
bloom in this poem. That Stevens chooses to place breaking and eating in such close 
proximity seems not to be a coincidence, since the sacrament of communion had been an 
implicit feature of several previous poems. In "The American Sublime," for example, 
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Stevens confronts "The empty spirit / In vacant space" by asking "What wine does one 
drink? / What bread does one eat?" (CP 131). In "The Rock," the possibility that poetry 
can cure an empty spirit in vacant space is affirmed at the very moment when the poem 
begins to accumulate transvalued ritual symbols: 
The fiction of the leaves is the icon 
Of the poem, the figuration of blessedness. 
And the icon is the man. The pearled chaplet of spring, 
The magnum wreath of summer, time's autumn snood. 
Its copy of the sun, these cover the rock. 
These leaves are the poem, the icon and the man. 
These are a cure of the ground and of ourselves. 
In the predicate that there is nothing else. (CP 526-27) 
An "icon" is an image, a sign whose form suggests its meaning, and a conventional 
religious image used in the devotions of Eastern Christians; "blessedness" connotes a 
quality of something held in reverence or honored in worship; a "chaplet" is both a 
wreath worn on the head and part of a rosary; and a "magnum" is a container that holds 
wine. Considered together, these words strongly suggest Stevens' discovery that nothing 
but a secularized ritual structure—delineated by the space of the poem—will 
simultaneously cure the imagination and reality. 
The remainder of the second section reinforces this idea. Poems that successfiilly 
enact a ritual structure can, like a ritual environment, be returned to repeatedly: "They 
bud and bloom and bear their fhiit without change" (CP 527). This is a strange statement 
fi-om a poet who had so often insisted that "It Must Change"; but Stevens seems hopeful 
in this poem that at least some of his poetic fictions would continue to bear the fioiit of 
nobility. He remains certain that his poems transcend empirical naturalism: "They are 
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more than leaves that cover the barren rock" (CP 527). And, by transcending empiricism, 
such poems create a visionary consciousness of imagination and reality: the final five 
cantos of the poem read like a celebratory litany of the possibilities engendered by ritual 
space. Stevens becomes so exuberantly hopeful that he finally says, 
In this plenty, the poem makes meanings of the rock. 
Of such mixed motion and such imagery 
That its barrenness becomes a thousand things 
And so exists no more. (CP 527) 
This is a stunning statement for a poet who had returned so faithfully to bareness, 
blankness, darkness, and nothingness; but the thousand things provided by the poem is 
precisely the "Affluence" Stevens' hopes his poems will bear in "The Planet on the 
Table." 
In the final section of "The Rock," Stevens follows the structure of ritual as he 
composes "Forms of the Rock in a Night-Hymn" through a heightening of incongruency. 
As in the second prelude of Jesuit meditation, this heightening of incongruency involves 
elaborately argued paradox: "The rock is the gray particular of man's life, / The stone 
from which he rises, up—and—^ho, / The step to the bleaker depths of his descents" (CP 
528). By the end of the second section, the poem has risen to such affirmative heights 
that incongruency nearly disappears along with the rock's bareness. The color gray 
provides a sobering moment—a reminder that reality's particulars must be held in the 
mind against the imagination's desire to order those particulars—so that the rising up is 
halted: "up—and—^ho" signals the climax of rising affirmation, and "ho" serves as a 
breathlessly clipped version of the command "whoa," which Stevens must speak to 
himself lest he be carried away into an affirmative indifference. In order to remain within 
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the confines of ritual structure, he must consummate a marriage between his mind and the 
outer universe by recognizing that "The rock," which is now the poem and the icon and 
the man, "is the habitation of the whole" (CP 528). This whole is the whole of 
incongruencies, of which there are many in this final section; "rises" is held against 
"descents"; the rock is both a "mirror of the planets" and a vision seen "through man's 
eye"; "silent" modifies the exuberant "rhapsodist"; "Turquoise," "redness," and 
"rightness" are posited against "odious," "evil," and "difficult"; "the things illumined / 
By day" is followed by "that which night illumines"; and "vivid," with its connotation of 
alertness, prevents "sleep"—and possibly death—from becoming a dulling narcotic (CP 
528). By bringing these opposing elements together, the poem functions like a ritual 
space: the reader is invited to think about imaginative fictions in terms of reality's 
particulars, and reality's particulars in terms of imaginative fictions. 
As the sublime achievements of this poem are brought to a close, Stevens 
explicitly acknowledges the vital boundary that delineates the mind as an internalized 
ritual space: "the rock" is also 
the main of things, the mind. 
The starting point of the human and the end. 
That in which space itself is contained, the gate 
To the enclosure, day, the things illumined 
By day, night and that which night illumines. 
Night and its midnight-minting fragrances, 
Night's hymn of the rock, as in a vivid sleep. (CP 528) 
By creating a vital boundary—"the gate / To the enclosure"—Stevens figures the mind as 
a site where "the stem particulars" of reality gain the distinction of nobility. Within this 
enclosure, imagination is married to reality in such a way that the darkness of night is 
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paradoxically illuminating. The affluence Stevens desires in "The Planet on the Table" is 
captured in this poem by the phrase "midnight-minting fragrances," where "minting" is 
both a heightening of sensual perception and the creation of wealth that transcends 
empirical perception. This wealth is evidenced by song—"Night's hymn of the rock"— 
which is the elegiacal song of the poem. The hymn of night, like the choiring of voices 
that appears throughout Stevens' poetry, represents the final phase of meditation, where, 
through a visionary moment, the voice is lifted up to speak in colloquy with nature. "The 
Rock" begins in the depths of despair as the crisis of death looms near; but through a 
transvaluation of ritual, the poem finally offers up one of Stevens' most powerful poetic 
sanctions for life. 
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CONCLUSION 
"St. Armorer's Church from the Outside," the poem that follows "The Rock" in 
Stevens' Collected Poems, provides an apt conclusion to this thesis in that it summarizes 
Stevens' attempt to create a secularized poetic form that could replace orthodox ritual 
structure. The poem begins with a meditative composition of place, which leads to the 
admission that "St. Armorer's was once an immense success. / It rose loftily and stood 
massively" (CP 529). As the site of ritual worship, the cathedral once provided a site 
where the profane was made sacred, and believers could be joined with God through the 
observation of the sacraments. Its efficacy in these matters ensured that upon death, 
believers would continue to live in permanent union with God in heaven: "to lie / In its 
church-yard, in the province of St. Armorer's, / Fixed one for good in geranium-colored 
day" (CP 529). With the disappearance of the gods, however, the church has become an 
empty and decaying shell: "What is left has the foreign smell of plaster, the closed-in 
smell of hay" (CP 529). What remains for Stevens is the isolation of an earth 
unsponsored by a deity, as well as the "cindery noes" of nature's entropy, from which he 
must create a new divinity, or "An ember yes" that ennobles and sanctions life (CP 529). 
If nobility is to be achieved, it requires a receptivity to nature's writhing fecundity: "A 
sumac grows / On the altar, growing toward the lights" (CP 529). But empirical 
receptivity is not enough; in a process that mirror's religious ritual, ordinary objects must 
be placed into the meditative imagination. In this poems, the sumac is placed in the 
poet's "chapel of breath," where it can be "seen / In a mystic eye" (CP 529). The act of 
placement makes the ordinariness of nature reveal a meaning beyond propositional 
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statement, or "the intelligible / In that which is created as its symbol" (CP 529). This 
visionary moment occurs when the mind is married to the outer universe, which creates 
"a new account of everything old," so that "A new colored sun" can "change forms / And 
spread hallucinations on every leaf (CP 529). As this ennobling vision takes shape, 
however, it must avoid solipsism by continuing to acknowledge "the outward blank" and 
"The need to be actual" (CP 529-30). By heightening a consciousness of the 
incongruency between visionary desire and blank nothingness, nobility is attained: "A 
sacred syllable rising from sacked speech" (CP 530). In a poetic process that can be 
ritualistically repeated, the sacred syllables breathed by the poet provide the sanctions for 
the freedom of life. By delineating the whole of ritual structure within the mind, and by 
conceiving the poem as a secularized temple, Stevens is able to create 
this dizzle-dazzle of being new 
And of becoming, for which the chapel spreads out 
Its arches in its vivid element, 
In the air of newness of that element. 
In an air of freshness, clearness, greenness, blueness. 
That which is always beginning because it is part 
Of that which is always beginning, over and over. 
The chapel underneath St. Armorer's walls, 
Stands in a light, its natural light and day. 
The origin and keep of its health and his own. 
And there he walks and does as he likes. 
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